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Why do states acquire nuclear weapons?  Many political models attempt to 
explain why states proliferate, each focusing on a specific level of analysis for its 
explanatory power.  The variables at each level are different; to form one, all-
encompassing model of proliferation would really explain nothing because it was 
purported to explain everything.  To be useful, a model must identify a specific process, 
or critical juncture at a particular analytic level, that sets it apart from other models.  Scott 
Sagan writes that the conventional wisdom for proliferation is security driven.1  In this 
model, threats in the international system drive states to proliferate; if there are no threats, 
the state will stay a non-nuclear state.   
The most complete view of proliferation will likely identify some motivations on 
each analytical level.  An aspiring proliferant will have international system, state level, 
and individual level motivations.  Each level of analysis can offer specific insight to a 
part of a state’s motivation for nuclear weapons.  Taken together, system, state, and 
individual level motivations can provide a fairly complete picture of a particular 
proliferation case.  Identifying the conditions at each analytical level can also be 
instructive as to nonproliferation policy measures that could work for a similar case in the 
future.  Linking specific policy measures to particular motivations can help proliferants 
opt for alternatives to nuclear weapons. 
After twenty years of varying international policies of sanctions, isolation, and 
confrontation, the Islamic Republic of Iran is still pursuing nuclear weapons.  For all the 
international effort, through the auspices of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), near daily revelations about Iran’s 
nuclear program cast considerable doubt as to its peaceful intentions.2  Iran claims it is 
threatened by Israel and the United States, but in reality those two states would not attack 
                                                 
1 See Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97); 54. Sagan writes, “States will seek to develop nuclear 
weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative 
means.” 
2 See “Timeline: Iran Nuclear Crisis,” BBC News, UK Edition, (27 November 2003); 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3210412.stm; accessed September 2004. 
2 
Iran unless it was developing or in possession of nuclear weapons.3  Given the probable 
detrimental effects to Iran’s international status, economy, and regime security if a covert 
nuclear weapons program were uncovered, the logical question is why its government 
would risk so much for seemingly so little return?   
Through the lens of the international anarchic system of self-help, developing a 
punitive deterrent to neighboring states that possess nuclear, biological, or chemical 
weapons seems logical, but examining complementary levels of analysis reveal a fuller 
picture of state motivations.  This thesis examines the Iranian nuclear program from three 
different perspectives.  Analysis at the systemic level shows Iran has legitimate security 
concerns, but has foregone exploration of alternative security solutions in favor of a 
nuclear deterrent.   
Deeper analysis at the state and individual levels reveals additional, more 
compelling reasons for Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.  When Iran was embroiled in 
its bitter war with Iraq, a coalition of political and military leaders convinced Ayatollah 
Khomeini to reverse his direction on a nuclear weapons program.  These nuclear security 
myth makers developed a following inside Iran’s government and within the 
organizations charged with operating the program.  The bureaucratic organizations that 
run Iran’s nuclear program now sustain it for parochial self-interests; they want to avoid 
consideration of alternative security solutions.   
Insights into Iran’s motivations at the three analytic levels can help policymakers 
address the causal factors for Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  To be successful, any 
coherent U.S. policy aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons must 
address the reasons Iran wants them.  Further, they must identify a means to influence the 
actors on each analytic level. 
A. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
This thesis addresses the interests that compel the Islamic Republic of Iran to 
pursue nuclear weapons.  To support the broader investigation, this thesis looks at three 
perspectives of Iran’s nuclear program, each addressing a specific level of analysis.  First, 
                                                 
3 See George Perkovich, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Challenge, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 8; 
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/Iran/iraniannuclearchallenge.pdf; accessed September 2004. 
3 
I examine Iran’s desired military doctrine based on propositions predicted by political 
realism.  Second, I look at the individuals that perpetuate Iran’s countervailing nuclear 
myths, one idealizing nuclear security, and the other nuclear insecurity.  Third, I analyze 
Iran’s bureaucratic inertia in pursuing nuclear weapons and the parochial self-interests 
that now dominate any discussion of whether to continue.  In each analysis, I identify 
policy measures that target the causal motivations at that level.  My motivation for 
examining these three levels lies in George Perkovich’s observation that, “for all its 
efforts to staunch flows of nuclear technology, materiel, and know-how into Iran, the 
U.S. government never has publicly and objectively assessed Iranian leaders’ motivations 
for seeking nuclear weapons and what the U.S. and others could do to remove those 
motivations.”4   
The main political relationship I see in Iran’s program follows this logic:  Balance 
of power reasoning was the impetus for Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  Nuclear myth 
makers convinced the ruling mullahs of the nuclear solution to that threat.  Bureaucratic 
inertia is keeping the program alive despite changes in Iran’s strategic landscape.  
1. System Level of Analysis 
A nuclear-armed Soviet Union encroached through Afghanistan then receded, 
taking its nuclear weapons out of central Asia as it left.  Iraq proved itself as Iran’s 
foremost threat with vicious chemical attacks in a protracted war.  The 1990s saw the rise 
of Pakistan and India as nuclear-armed states.  Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood, 
but why does Tehran think that developing nuclear weapons will minimize that danger?   
The thesis starts by looking at Iran’s strategic environment and how it has shaped 
Iran’s military doctrine.  By identifying the doctrine Iran appears to be adopting, whether 
it is offensive, defensive, or deterrent in nature, one can deduce why it desires nuclear 
weapons.  Iran has chosen a defensive doctrine against threat nations equipped with 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and a deterrent doctrine against states with 
formidable conventional military capabilities.  Once Iran can build a survivable second 
strike capability, it will use a deterrent doctrine overall.  Realism would predict Iran 
would develop nuclear weapons based on its strategic environment in the 1970s and early 
                                                 
4 Perkovich, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Challenge, 3. 
4 
1980s, but as strategic threats have been mitigated or neutralized, Iran has not changed its 
doctrinal objectives.  Balance of power considerations were the impetus for nuclear 
weapons, but bureaucratic politics are ensuring the program continues. 
2. Individual Level of Analysis 
Iran’s leaders mistrust western guarantees and feel compelled to regain all the 
political power and independence they perceive is present in controlling a private nuclear 
arsenal.  Looking at the individual level of analysis, this thesis argues that Iran’s leaders 
are locked onto particular self-interests of which they will be very reluctant to let go.  
Borrowing from a proliferation model advanced by Peter Lavoy, the thesis looks at the 
individual “myth makers” that have convinced bureaucratic and state leaders of the 
overwhelming utility of nuclear weapons to secure Iran’s status as a regional hegemon.5  
Nuclear myth makers are societal elites that convince governmental leaders of the 
“military security and political power” provided by nuclear weapons.6  The thesis also 
looks at how Iran uses the nuclear insecurity myth to assure the international community 
that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons; that they are against the Islamic faith; that they 
would only make Iran more vulnerable; but that Iran has the right to develop all forms of 
civilian nuclear energy.  Nuclear myths appeal to nationalism and popular will and 
convince leaders of the security imperative that can only be answered by developing or 
possessing nuclear weapons. 
3. State Level of Analysis 
Analysis of Iran’s security environment as it has evolved over the last thirty years 
reveals that interest pursuits begun in the 1970s are difficult to reverse in the face of 
different security landscapes today.    Bureaucratic politics refers to a sub-national model 
of policy formation based on the machinations of agencies and coalitions to determine 
state policy consistent with their own parochial interests.  The theoretical foundation for 
sub-national analysis rests with the pioneering work of Graham Allison.7  By establishing 
                                                 
5 See Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” in The Proliferation 
Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results, ed. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel 
(London: Frank Cass, 1993), 199. 
6 Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths,” 199. 
7 See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis; (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1971), 162-184. 
5 
the extent to which the Iranian nuclear weapons program is sustained by bureaucratic 
political competition, the study then examines policy considerations that must be 
addressed to effectively deal with Iran’s bureaucratic inertia.  If balance of power 
considerations provided the impetus for nuclear weapons and bureaucratic politics are 
sustaining the program, then there must be individuals within the Iranian government that 
propel the “myth” of nuclear security that sustains bureaucratic and systemic beliefs. 
4. Policy Relationships 
Given specific considerations at each analytic level, the policymaker must tailor 
policy choices to address concerns at each stop.  The larger challenge is to ensure any 
policy measure aimed at counterproliferation objectives is synchronized with the overall 
national policy strategy for that country.  Overturning Iran’s nuclear program would do 
little good if it lost leverage on other priority agendas, such as Iran’s sponsorship of 
terrorist groups against Israel.  The thesis’s conclusions recommend centers of gravity 
U.S. policy need to address at each level of analysis to coerce Iran to not develop nuclear 
weapons. The utility of identifying specific policy interests at each level of Iran’s 
international relations will give policy makers a more comprehensive view of issues that 
need to be addressed in any rational calculation to coerce Iranian pursuit of nuclear 
weapons. 
Table 1 illustrates the progression of my argument along the analytic level 
continuum.  Note that for clarity, I have arranged the analytic levels in descending order, 
but that the thesis proceeds from system to individual, then to state level of analysis to 
trace the thread progression among them.  The table relates the key relationships I find 
through each particular analytic lens on Iran’s nuclear program.  For instance, when 
looking at Iran through the eyes of the international system using a balance of power 
perspective, I find that Iran is isolated, with no large-power alliance options to protect it 
against Israel and the United States—the two largest threats as Iran perceives its threat 
environment.  Iran’s strategy to deal with isolation against Israel and the United States is 
to develop a deterrence doctrine with nuclear weapons at the fore.  Tailored policy 
measures for this level include reducing Iran’s threat perception by working to solve the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and to work toward a Gulf security organization that would include 
Iran and the new Iraqi government (see Table 1). 
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5. Prospects for Policy  
The conventional wisdom is that the reassertion of conservative control over the 
Iranian government, begun in the February 2004 parliamentary election, is meant to allow 
the conservatives to approve popular governmental reforms while denying credit for such 
reform to the so-called reformers.8  The widespread belief is that the parliament, or 
Majlis, will not take any reform action until after the presidential election scheduled in 
February 2005, when a conservative replacement for reformist president Khatami is 
expected.  Once the conservatives have firm control over every aspect of the Iranian 
government, they will have two main choices: they can enact reforms and moderate the 
Islamic Republic’s position, or, they can crack down and reassert revolutionary values for 
an Islamic society governed by strict interpretations of Islamic law, or Sharia.  Given the 
popular emergence of the 60 percent of the population under age twenty five, the 
conservatives face formidable challenges to their authority and a possible 
counterrevolution if they do not enact social reforms.9   
                                                 
8 Perkovich, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Challenge, 12. 
9 Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran’s Theocracy Under Siege,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 1 (Spring, 2003): 
139. For a more detailed analysis of the potential impact of the Iranian youth movement on the 
Level of Analysis/ 
Analytic Model 
Key Relationships–Iran’s 
Nuclear Weapons Program  
U.S. Policy Measures Thesis 
International 
System: 
 Balance of Power 
Perceives U.S. and Israeli Threats 
No Alliance Options—Self-Sufficiency 
Striving for Deterrent Doctrine 
Reduce Threat Perceptions: 
Minimize U.S.-Israeli Posture 




Competitive Bureaucratic Coalitions 
Resist Devolution at Expense of Others 
Sustain Nuclear Weapons Program 
Cooperative Containment: 
Subvert Nuclear Coalition 
Empower Rival Bureaucracies 
Ch. IV 
Individual: 
 Nuclear Myth Makers 
Nuclear Myth Makers in Key Positions 
Nuclear Security vs. Insecurity Myths 
Institutionalizing of Myths 
Discredit Security Myth: 
Foster Internal Debate 
Educate Internal Debate 
Ch. III 
Table 1. Levels of Analysis Resultant/Policy Relationships 
 
7 
Amid these developments, the best thing the United States can do is to continue 
isolating the conservative government and seek to not ignite Iranian nationalism, which 
serves to strengthen the conservatives’ position within Iranian society and within the 
government.  Worse yet, if the United States engages the conservatives, offering 
economic aid and unfreezing Iran’s pre-revolutionary assets without securing the 
concessions it has demanded for the past twenty-five years, the younger generation will 
view the United States as complicit in the conservatives’ extended hold on power and 
reject any future U.S. overtures for normalized relations with the replacement 
government they shall represent. 
B. EVOLUTION OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM 
1. The Shah’s Program 
Iran’s civilian nuclear energy program began while Shah Mohammed Reza 
Pahlavi was still in power, buying a five-megawatt research reactor from the United 
States in 1967.  Having been one of the first to sign and ratify the NPT in 1970, the 
shah’s nuclear energy program was supported by several Western powers.  The United 
States, France, and West Germany all provided Iran with reactors and technical 
training.10  The shah’s “motives were a fusion of Iranian national ambition and concern 
for the direction of the neighborhood.”11  Scholars assume the shah also directed a 
parallel weapons program, using the openly declared civil nuclear power program as a 
springboard for developing weapons grade fuel and as a cover to develop the technical 
know-how for weapons design and manufacturing, which ended upon his overthrow in 
1979. 12  Because the United States wanted the shah to rise to the role of Gulf 
protectorate, U.S. leaders looked the other way on Iran’s early nuclear foray. 
                                                 
conservative-led government, see also Bahman Baktiari and Haleh Vaziri, “Iran’s Liberal Revolution?” 
Current History, (January 2002). 
10 See Chris Quillen, “Iranian Nuclear Weapons Policy: Past, Present, and Possible Future,” Middle 
East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 2 (June 2002): 17. 
11 Geoffrey Kemp and Walter Lippmann, “How to Stop the Iranian Bomb,” The National Interest, no. 
72 (Summer 2003):  par. 10. 
12 See Brenda Schaffer, “Iran at the Nuclear Threshold,” Arms Control Today; Arms Control 
Association, (Washington, D.C.: Nov 2003); http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Shaffer.asp?print; 
accessed July 2004. For a comprehensive review and relative timeline of Iran’s nuclear weapons programs 
under the shah and the Islamic Republic, see also Anthony H. Cordesman, Proliferation in the “Axis of 
Evil:” North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2002), 27-37. 
8 
2. Rebirth after the Iran-Iraq War 
After Ayatollah Khomeini’s ascendance, Iran’s nuclear program lay dormant until 
1984, when the Islamic Republic was embroiled in its bitter war with Iraq.13  Having 
sustained fearsome losses, many from Iraq’s use of chemical weapons (which was largely 
ignored by the international community), the Iranian regime was forced to find a 
balancing capability and nuclear (along with chemical and later, biological) weapons, 
appeared to be that balance.14  Because of the U.S.-led arms embargo (as a result of the 
revolution’s takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran), Iran felt isolated from the 
international community while Iraq enjoyed economic and military aid from Europe and 
the Soviet Union.  According to Geoffrey Kemp, “these memories continue to generate 
bitterness among Iranians” and are prime motivators in the regime’s “strong anti-
colonialist nationalism” as it strives for self-sufficiency in every respect, including its 
nuclear program.15 
In 1989, Iran announced it had discovered uranium ore deposits near Saghand, 
and it intended to begin mining operations in 1990, followed by enrichment facility 
construction by 1994.  In 1992, Russia announced it had signed an agreement with Iran to 
assist in construction of a light-water reactor in Bushehr, on the southwest coast as well 
as a bilateral agreement to provide nuclear fuel support.16  The international community 
accepted this progression of events, albeit with suspicion, based on Iran’s appearance of 
conforming to IAEA protocols, although the United States is still pressuring Russia to 
abandon its assistance to the Islamic Republic.   
                                                 
  13 See Gregory F. Giles, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
Weapons,” in Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 
Weapons, ed., Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); 
82.  For political background on the revolution that toppled the Shah, see Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran Since 
1921: The Pahlavis and After, (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2003), 192-249; Nikkie R. Keddie, 
Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 214-62; and 
Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation, (New York: Penguin Putnam, 
1998), 271-333. 
14 See Geoffrey Kemp and Walter Lippmann, “How to Stop the Iranian Bomb,” The National Interest, 
no. 72 (Summer 2003):  48; and Giles, “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” 81-82. 
15 Kemp and Lippmann, “How to Stop the Iranian Bomb,” 48. 
16 Schaffer, “Iran at the Nuclear Threshold,” 2. 
9 
If the light-water reactor was the limit of the Iranian program, then it may be true 
that Iran is only developing a nuclear power capability.  The complications of 
reprocessing spent fuel from a light-water reactor make it unlikely that Iran would use 
upgraded uranium from such a process to develop nuclear weapons.  In order to extract 
the material, the reactor must be shut down, which would be immediately noticed by 
IAEA and U.S. monitoring.17  It would not make sense to risk such an easy discovery for 
such a small yield.  But the United States and others believe Iran has been pursuing 
nuclear weapons all along. 
3. Revelations 
After Washington received a tip from an Iranian opposition group about nuclear 
activities unknown to the United States and the IAEA, the United States released satellite 
photos showing two additional nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak.18  In February 2003, Iran 
confirmed it was building a heavy-water reactor at Arak and a uranium enrichment plant 
at Natanz.  The disclosure also admitted Iran had imported undeclared quantities of 
processed uranium from China in 1992, which would put it in violation of the terms of 
the NPT.19  Also in February, Iranian President Khatami publicly declared that these 
facilities were designed to allow Iran to produce its own nuclear fuel.  The complexity of 
the Iranian program suggests an advanced technological commitment and capability 
beyond civil power requirements. 
The addition of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant of the size seen at Natanz plus a 
heavy-water reactor casts reasonable doubt on the intentions of the Iranian program.  
Both capabilities can produce more nuclear fuel than one commercial light-water reactor 
would need.  IAEA environmental analysis of these centrifuges revealed the presence of 
enriched uranium even though Iran had claimed it had only tested the equipment with 
                                                 
17 See International Crisis Group, “Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Middle East Report no.18, 
(Amman/Brussels, 27 October 2003), 5 and 8, http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2330&l=1; 
Internet; accessed 5 November 2003. The ICG report has a useful guide to nuclear technology terminology 
and requirements for the “non-expert.” 
18 See “Timeline: Iran Nuclear Crisis,” BBC News, UK Edition.  
19 See International Crisis Group, “Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 6; and Kemp and Lippmann, 
“How to Stop the Iranian Bomb,” 2003, par. 16. 
10 
inert gases.20  And here lies a troubling discontinuity: Iran first claimed the centrifuges 
were built indigenously, but then claimed the high-grade uranium contamination came 
from an unnamed country from which they purchased the equipment.  Either Iran was 
upgrading uranium it claimed it didn’t have with indigenous centrifuge equipment, or, it 
was transferring used, undeclared nuclear technology it claimed was indigenous.  With 
the missile technology it has received from North Korea and China, the nuclear weapons 
production assistance Iran appears to be getting from Pakistan (suspected supplier of the 
gas centrifuges) portends a nuclear weapons threat to Israel and other U.S. interests in the 
region within two to four years.21 
4. European Three and the Additional Protocol 
Pushing the IAEA to declare Iran in “material breach” of its commitments to the 
NPT, the United States settled instead to support a proposal from Britain, France, and 
Germany (the European Three) to give Iran until the end of October 2003 to fully 
disclose nuclear activities and allow surprise inspections.  The European Three proposal 
centered on negotiating an agreement whereby Iran would sign the additional protocol to 
the NPT.  Pressured by Japan to sign the additional protocol as a contingent for a 
Japanese oil trade agreement and by the European Union as an inducement to conclude a 
trade deal Tehran wants very much, Iran agreed to suspend all uranium enrichment in 
October 2003, and sign the additional protocol.22  The European Three ministers were 
able to capitalize on some desirable carrots to induce Iran to agree to the IAEA’s 
demands for increased transparency and full cooperation, without intervention by the UN 
Security Council.  This is instructive on how the Islamic regime sees itself and how it 
demands to be treated.  Iran wants to be recognized as the regional hegemon and the 
leader of all Islamic nations. 
Iran’s provocative behavior in the summer of 2004 had the European Three 
foreign ministers in a panic.  They had bargained in good faith, staving off the United 
                                                 
20 See International Crisis Group, “Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 6. 
21 See Gary Samore, Future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (Brussels: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, European Security Forum, 3 March 2003); http://www.iiss.org/eusec/samore.htm; 
accessed August 2004; also International Crisis Group, “Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 8. 
22 Schaffer, “Iran at the Nuclear Threshold,” 2003. 
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States and the UN Security Council, only to be cast aside by Iran’s announcement in 
August 2004 that it would resume enrichment preparations.  The European Three 
continued to convey the seriousness of resuming uranium enrichment, but Iran presented 
a unified face of defiance.  The future of Europe’s trade and cooperation agreement 















Figure 1.   Map of Iran’s Declared Nuclear Facilities23 
 
Based on what Iran has admitted when confronted by the IAEA, it has a diverse 
nuclear program dispersed across the country at ten different locations.  Figure 1 and 
Table 2 highlight these locations.  Table 2 also provides some background on the 
activities at each site (see Figure 1 and Table 2). 
                                                 
23 After: “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report 
by the Director General, GOV/2003/75, Annex 4. Map outline courtesy “Free Blank Outline Map of Iran,” 




                                                 
24 After: “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report 
by the Director General, GOV/2003/75. 
 
List of Facilities Relevant to the  
Implementation of IAEA Safeguards 
LOCATION CAPABILITY STATUS 
TEHRAN NUCLEAR 
RESEARCH CENTER Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) Operating 
TEHRAN 
Molybdenum, Iodine, and Xenon 
Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX 
Facility) 
Constructed but not operating 
 *Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) Operating 
 *Waste Handling Facility (WHF) Operating 
TEHRAN *Kalaye Electric Company Dismantled pilot enrichment facility 
BUSHEHR Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) Under construction 
ESFAHAN NUCLEAR 
TECHNOLOGY CENTER 
Miniature Neutron Source Reactor 
(MNSR) Operating 
 Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR) Operating 
 Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWSPR) Operating 
 Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL) Operating 
 Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL) Closed down 
 Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) Under construction, some units operational 
 Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor (GSCR) Decommissioned 
 *Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) In detailed design stage, construction was to begin in 2004 
NATANZ *Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) Operating 
 *Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) Under construction 
KARAJ *Radioactive Waste Storage Under construction, but partially operating 
LASHKAR AB’AD *Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant Dismantled 
ARAK *Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) In detailed design phase 
 *Hot cell facility for production of radioisotopes In preliminary design phase 
 *Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) 
Under construction – Not subject 
to Safeguards Agreement 
ANARAK *Waste Storage Site Waste to be transferred to JHL 
SAGHAND Uranium Mine Operating 
YAZD University of Yazd Nuclear Research Department Operating 
* = Facilities newly declared in 2003 
All data current as of November 2003  
Table 2. Iran’s Declared Nuclear Facilities24 
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C. ROADMAP 
Chapter II, Iran’s Military Doctrine and Nuclear Weapons: This chapter examines 
Iran’s desired military doctrine.  By examining the strategic environment in which Iran 
now finds itself from a balance of power perspective, this chapter explains Iran’s pursuit 
of nuclear weapons as the technical requirement for its primary military doctrine.  
Military doctrine is the operational factor to help a state meet its grand strategy, so it 
follows that if a state perceives it must establish a particular doctrine to achieve the goals 
articulated in its strategy, it requires the military capabilities necessary to execute that 
doctrine.  The “cause” then, for Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is its perceived 
requirement to meet its chosen doctrine. 
Chapter III, Iran’s Nationalist Myth Makers:  This chapter explores the role of 
political elites within the Iranian government that propelled and now sustain Iran’s 
nuclear weapons program with the nuclear security myth.  The chapter also examines 
Iran’s use of the nuclear insecurity myth as deliberate cover of the nuclear weapons 
program.  By discerning the major arguments advocated by Iran’s myth makers, the 
chapter distills particular policy objectives the United States must address, either directly 
or through stable proxies, to discredit the security myth and compel Iran’s leadership to 
abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
Chapter IV, Iran’s Nuclear Program and Bureaucratic Politics: This chapter 
examines the internal machinery at work in the Iranian government and how that 
influences state interest perceptions.  This chapter contends that Iran’s nuclear weapons 
program is sustained by bureaucratic political influences; therefore policy prescriptions 
for Iran must undercut the nuclear lobby and empower rival groups such as energy and 
trade.  This chapter addresses Iran’s nuclear program on the sub-national level in two 
parts: part one examines the internal machinery at work in the Iranian government and 
how it influences state interest perceptions.  The analysis contrasts bureaucratic politics 
considerations with those of the international balance of power model by illustrating 
inter-agency competition, power perceptions that drive state interests, and considerations 
for bureaucratic actors and processes.  Having highlighted sources of bureaucratic 
influence within the Iranian government, part two identifies sub-national policy 
14 
considerations to subvert the nuclear weapons coalition while encouraging rival 
bureaucracies to step up for economic incentives. 
Chapter V, Conclusions:  Summarizes Iranian interests and motivations at each 
level of analysis and relates them to U.S. policy requirements to address or answer those 
interests if the United States is to succeed at preventing Iran from procuring nuclear 
weapons.  This chapter arranges policy options, advocated in the scholarly literature, into 
a discernable spectrum of options at each level of analysis.  Overall policy 
recommendations focus on a multilateral coalition to force the conservative government 
to either acquiesce to traditional U.S. conditions for multilateral economic incentives, or 
collapse under its own weight; then offer the same carrots to its replacement.  
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II. IRAN’S MILITARY DOCTRINE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Iran’s strategic environment today is vastly different than it was when it re-
launched its nuclear program in 1984.25  The intervening years witnessed the ebb and 
flow of bordering military powers, culminating in a growing U.S. presence throughout 
the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.  Today, Iran faces a disarmed Iraq, a shattered 
Afghanistan, economic competitors in the Caspian states, and strained relations with 
nuclear-armed Pakistan while it engages India.  Focused on Israel and the U.S. military 
presence in the Gulf, Iran’s nuclear program is, ironically, designed to counter threats that 
exist only in reaction to its own weapons programs and support for terrorism.26   
This chapter examines Iran’s systemic motivations for nuclear weapons.  I argue 
that Iran is a status quo state that is building a self-reliant military capability, 
emphasizing a minimum deterrence doctrine to dissuade potential aggressors.  The 
chapter looks at whether Iran’s grand strategy reflects its strategic environment and how 
its military doctrine is designed to support that grand strategy.  Iran is pursuing a grand 
strategy for which it was better suited twenty years ago.  Striving to become self-
sufficient against the varied threats that once surrounded it, Iran has yet to notice that 
most of those threats no longer exist, while others are overstated.  Meanwhile, Iran is 
progressing toward fulfillment of a deterrence doctrine, wherein nuclear weapons 
promise the required punishment to potential threats.  The “cause” for Iran’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons is its perceived requirement to meet its military doctrine. 27   
Using the baseline realist propositions established in The Sources of Military 
Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, I address Iran’s 
nuclear program motivations on the systemic level in three parts.  In the first part, I 
                                                 
25 For a comprehensive discussion on the progression of Iran’s nuclear weapons programs under the 
shah and the Islamic Republic, see Cordesman, Proliferation in the “Axis of Evil,” 27-37.  
26 See Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978): 
169-73. This constitutes the classic security dilemma, where measures taken to increase one’s security 
decrease the security of the other. For a perspective on the circular nature of Iran’s threat perception of 
Israel and the United States, see Perkovich, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Challenge, 8. 
27 See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the 
World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell, 1984), 13-14. 
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provide an overview of the theoretical basis for this analysis, as presented by Barry Posen 
and refined by Scott Sagan.  In the second part, I analyze Iran’s strategic environment 
and identify Iran’s primary threat perceptions.  In the final segment, I identify three 
policy considerations the United States must address on the systemic level in any effort to 
dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons.  Because Iran perceives itself as isolated 
against Israel and the United States, with no alliance options, it is pursuing nuclear 
weapons to deter Israel and U.S. forces in the region.  To change Iran’s threat 
perceptions, the United States must work to reduce its own threatening rhetoric, revive 
the Israeli peace process, and encourage a new Gulf security organization that includes 
both the new Iraqi government and Iran.    
A. BALANCE OF POWER AND MILITARY DOCTRINE: THE THEORY 
Neorealist theory predicates that states existing in an anarchic international 
system must help themselves to maintain their security and protect their interests.  
Because of the overwhelming power of nuclear weapons, a state threatened by another 
that possesses nuclear weapons must balance that threat by developing its own nuclear 
arsenal.  If it does not possess the resources for nuclear weapons, the threatened state 
must enter a military alliance with a state that can provide a nuclear security guarantee.28  
In this regard, strong states do “what they can” to maintain their security and weak states 
do “what they must.”29  Strong states use their capacity to develop a self-sufficient 
nuclear deterrent while weak states look for a security guarantor to provide their defense.  
When two competing powers balance each other internally, each makes the other feel less 
secure with each balancing measure.  This is the essence of the balance of power security 
dilemma, blamed for instigating and sustaining arms races.  Sagan points out that nuclear 
                                                 
28 See what Scott Sagan notes is the “seminal text of neorealism,” Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 117-120. Here, Waltz deduces the basics of 
balance of power before testing the theory. For a discussion of rational actors and cost-benefit analysis in 
the security dilemma, see Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 170.  For alternate 
discussions on causes of proliferation, see Richard K. Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and 
Nonproliferation Revisited,” in The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results, 
ed. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 100-124. Betts observes that 
weak states invite preemption by larger powers if they get a bomb: “weak nations have no reason to fear 
that a superpower would attack them with nuclear weapons; conventional forces could do the job alone.”  
See also Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation,” in The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results, ed. Zachary 
S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 37-78. 
29 See Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 57. 
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weapons can also be used as a deterrent against overwhelming conventional capabilities 
or to act as “coercive tools” to change the status quo.30  However, realism cannot predict 
the actual role a state’s nuclear arsenal will play in its grand strategy without accounting 
for the state’s strategic goals.  Do states desire “security” or “maximization of power?”  
The answer is found in a state’s grand strategy. 
1. Applying Realism to Military Doctrine 
Developing realism’s themes further, Barry Posen extrapolated thirteen 
propositions of balance of power theory that predict the doctrinal roles of states’ military 
forces, based on the strategic environment in which they reside.31  Posen differentiates 
among offensive, defensive, and deterrent military doctrines to further define the military 
role required to support the state’s grand strategy.  Grand strategy is defined as the 
military “means-ends chain” that comprises the state’s theory of its own security.  
Military doctrine is the “subcomponent” of grand strategy that deals with which military 
means should be employed and how they should be used to meet the state’s strategic 
goals (ends).32  An offensive doctrine endeavors to destroy an enemy’s military forces 
and disarm it.  A defensive doctrine seeks to deny an enemy’s military objectives.  A 
deterrent doctrine aims to punish an aggressor, raising the cost of aggression to an 
unacceptable level and prompting it to not pursue attack.  Posen’s version of balance of 
power is loosely derived from Waltzian neorealist thinking, but his hypotheses are meant 
to explain the causes of doctrine, not general behavior.33 
Whether a state should balance a threat externally or internally is largely 
determined by cultural, economic, and political factors.  In the pre-nuclear era, states that 
did not have the technological infrastructure or financial resources to engage in an arms 
race looked outside for an alliance to provide security guarantees.  In the era of nuclear 
                                                 
30
 See Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 57 
31
 See Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 59-79. 
32
 Ibid., 13. 
33
 See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 121-123. Waltz distinguishes theories of international 
politics from theories that explain foreign policy. He reasons that balance of power theory explains “the 
constraints that confine all states. The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the expected 
reactions of states, but by itself the theory cannot explain those reactions.” 
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weapons and nonproliferation regimes, states not officially in the nuclear club must align 
themselves with a nuclear patron or work outside the normative international system.  
Balance of power theory predicts politically “isolated states” will look for internal 
balancing in a multipolar system.34  Although whether the current international strategic 
environment is multipolar may be debated, it is clear that from a strategic, military 
perspective, the nuclear powers are essentially balanced against each other, creating a 
pseudo multipolar environment.  In the modern construct of security regimes, politically 
isolated states pose the greatest risk for working outside the regimes and procuring 
nuclear, or other unconventional weapons, to create an internal balance.  Given Iran’s 
twenty five-year history of political isolation, it is a prime candidate for developing 
covert asymmetrical warfare capabilities.  
Probably the most important factor allowing states some choice of doctrine within 
this list of predictions is the rational actor calculus, wherein a state will construct a 
doctrine that preserves its interests at the lowest possible cost.  This caveat trumps nearly 
all other considerations.  If a state has a predicted interest in an offensive doctrine but 
lacks the economic and military resources to support such a doctrine, then that state can 
tailor its doctrine to the capabilities it can manage.  This may be why status quo strategies 
are the rule among states, and expansionist strategies are the exception.35   
2. Seven Propositions 
Posen offers thirteen predictive propositions of military doctrine, seven of which 
apply to Iran:36 
• States predisposed to conquest and expansion will prefer offensive 
doctrines. 
• States will try to pass the costs of war on to others, meaning states will 
prefer to fight on the adversary’s territory. 
• States without allies will prefer offensive doctrine 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 62. 
35 Ibid., 68-69. 
36 Posen’s remaining six propositions pertain to large patrons and hegemonic states with established 
nuclear capabilities and alliance systems, not applicable to an aspiring nuclear power such as Iran. The text 




• States surrounded by bordering threats especially prefer offensive 
doctrines to prevent multi-front wars and to defeat multi-state threats 
sequentially 
• Small states may choose a deterrent doctrine because their capabilities are 
insufficient to support either an offensive or defensive doctrine 
• Status quo states will generally prefer defensive doctrines if geography or 
technology makes such a doctrine attractive 
• Status quo states may prefer defensive doctrines because they know they 
will not strike the first blow 
  These seven propositions frame this chapter’s analysis of Iran’s military 
doctrine, while looking at the likely threats Iran faces in its strategic environment. 
• States Predisposed to Conquest and Expansion will Prefer Offensive 
Doctrines. 
 If Iran’s grand strategy was to export the revolution and expand its territory to 
create a greater Islamic Empire as a home for disaffected Shi’a Muslims from around the 
world, this proposition would indicate an offensive military doctrine to facilitate such 
expansion.  However, even in 1979-1980, when the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s revolutionary rhetoric was at its apogee, Iran’s regular military (or, Artesh), 
was undergoing a brutal consolidation into the Islamic Republic.  The officer corps was 
purged by as much as 45 percent, mostly by firing squad, and the remainder was 
enveloped by clerical commissars embarked on an aggressive “Islamization” of the 
military.37  What remained of the “revolutionary fervor” among the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was tested hard by the eight year defensive war with 
Iraq in the 1980s.38  Iran has spent a significant amount of its efforts since then to rebuild 
the IRGC and the Artesh into a defensive force to prevent more invasions.  Posen’s 
proposition for expansionist states does not fit Iran. 
 
 
                                                 
37 Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, (Washington, DC: 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000), 68; as quoted in Daniel L. 
Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold Green, Iran's Security Policy in the Post-
Revolutionary Era (Washington, D.C.: Rand National Defense Research Institute Publications, 2001), 32. 
38 See Byman et al, Iran's Security Policy, 43-44. 
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• States will try to pass the Costs of War on to Others, Meaning States will 
prefer to Fight on the Adversary’s Territory. 
This is evident in Iran’s extensive missile program.  Determined to be self-
sufficient on every level of military equipment and training, Iran has invested much of its 
defense budget over the last twenty years in increasingly capable surface-to-surface and 
ballistic missiles.  Iran created a manufacturing capability to produce its own versions of 
the North Korean No Dong medium range ballistic missile, the Shahab-3, with a 1,300 
km (800 mi.) range, and is developing longer range models.  The Shahab-4 is estimated 
to have a 1,900 km/1200 mi. range and the Shahab-5 could reach continental Europe.39  
Aside from the cost advantages of a fleet of missiles over a new fleet of combat aircraft, 
missiles launched into the adversary’s territory ensure the costly destruction of modern 
war occurs on territory away from the homeland. 
• States without Allies Prefer Offensive Doctrine.   
Iran is politically isolated and without a state-level ally, but it lacks the military 
wherewithal to adopt an offensive doctrine.  Offensive doctrines using conventional 
military forces require closely coordinated employment, integrating air, land, and sea 
forces.40  Iran is largely incapable of highly coordinated, joint military operations.  Iran’s 
air force is in poor shape: short of spare parts, most of its aircraft are not combat capable.  
The army is in similar condition, short of battle tanks and serviceable artillery.  The 
Islamic Republic spends a great deal of resources trying to acquire or produce required 
parts and munitions through clandestine channels.41  Analysts estimate Iran lost as much 
as 60 percent of its conventional military capability in the closing battles of the Iran-Iraq 
war, and has not been able to effectively replace much of that in the sixteen years since.42  
Ironically, the Iranian military posed a larger regional threat under the shah.  Neighboring 
                                                 
39 See Peter Jones, “Iran’s Threat Perceptions and Arms Control Policies,” The Nonproliferation 
Review 6, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 48-9. 
40 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 14. 
41 See Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions, and Impact, 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1994): 29-31. Chubin also points out that a “decade of 
buying whatever was available was a logistical nightmare—nine types of tanks, seven types of antitank 
missiles, and a motley assortment of weapons systems of varying sophistication, generation and 
provenance—enormously complicating maintenance and support.” 
42 Jones, “Iran’s Threat Perceptions,” 45-46. 
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Gulf States agree that Iran, today, does not pose much of an offensive, conventional 
military threat.   
• States Surrounded by Bordering Threats Especially Prefer Offensive 
Doctrines to Prevent Multi-Front Wars and to Defeat Multi-State Threats 
Sequentially.   
This seems especially plausible for Iran, as it views the landscape around its own 
borders to be unfriendly.  The removal of Iraq as an existential threat in 2003 may merely 
mean, from Iran’s point of view, that the United States moves in its place.  However, as 
much as Iran, and the Iranian military institutions, may wish for the capability to establish 
an offensive military doctrine, it is too far out of reach until it can procure newer 
conventional military hardware, or elevate its military into an asymmetric force with 
unconventional weapons and reliable delivery systems.   
• Small States May Choose a Deterrent Doctrine Because Their Capabilities 
are Insufficient to Support Either an Offensive or Defensive Doctrine.   
Given the assumptions of the two previous propositions, this would seem to 
describe Iran’s position fairly accurately.  But as Scott Sagan points out in his realist 
propositions (articulated below), an effective nuclear deterrent is dependent on the ability 
to survive a first-strike counterforce engagement.  Without a second-strike nuclear 
capability, the best for which an aspiring nuclear power can hope is to encounter a 
“mutual deterrent.”43  It is likely, however, that Iran views its chemical and biological 
warfare capabilities as a standing deterrent against neighboring conventional military 
threats.44  Gregory Giles points out in his work on Iran’s unconventional weapons 
doctrine, that Iran’s use of chemical weapons at the end of the war with Iraq indicated a 
“no first-use” posture.  Instead, it appeared as if Iran was maintaining a second-strike 
doctrine to deter follow-on unconventional attacks.45 
 
 
                                                 
43 See Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems,” in 
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, ed. 
Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 25.  
44 Giles, “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” 92. 
45 Ibid., 92. 
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• Status Quo States will Generally Prefer Defensive Doctrines if Geography 
or Technology Makes Such a Doctrine Attractive.   
Iran can rightly be viewed as a status quo state.  Despite the early revolutionary 
rhetoric and the occasional polemic today, Iran’s actual behavior matches that of a status 
quo state.  Iran’s only open military conflict since the revolution was its eight year war 
with Iraq, which Iraq began with its invasion of Iran in 1980.  Further, Iran’s geography 
gives it great strategic depth, allowing it to take the time required to analyze threats 
thoroughly before counter attacking, since any invader must traverse a long distance 
before threatening any of Iran’s major cities.46  Although a ballistic missile threat renders 
this point moot, Iran’s previous conduct hints that the Islamic Republic, overall, 
considers itself a status quo power with a defensive mindset.  In its only war, it was a 
defensive force, having suffered an invasion from a foreign power (status quo).  Iran has 
implemented a rigid, centralized command and control regimen for its chemical weapons 
that demonstrates no real-time urgency, suggesting a dependence on conventional 
defenses to hold off attackers until the supreme leader can authorize the use of chemical 
munitions.47 
• Status Quo States May Prefer Defensive Doctrines Because They Know 
They will not Strike the First Blow.   
Having established that Iran is a status quo state, this prediction could fit Iran, if it 
could be believed to also employ a defensive doctrine.  A subtle, yet telling nuance by the 
chairman of the Expediency Council, former president Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, may have revealed Iran’s underlying doctrinal goal.  In an impromptu 
harangue during the Friday prayers in December 2001, while highlighting the Islamic 
world’s intent to stand up to the “imperialists” and Israel, Rafsanjani also “invoked a 
hypothetical Muslim nuclear capability.  Importantly, he seemed to posit such a 
capability as a second-strike deterrent against pre-emptive attacks by Israel or the United 
States against Iran.”48  Although there is a fine line between deterrence and defense, 
Rafsanjani attaches the telling caveat to this statement with his emphasis on a second-
                                                 
46 Ibid., 99. 
47 Ibid., 98-99. 
48 See Perkovich, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Challenge, 6. 
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strike capability to act as a deterrent to Israel and the United States.  This may indicate 
Iran, like China before its 1964 nuclear weapon test, is planning for a nuclear deterrent 
capability in the long term, but as a nascent nuclear power may be willing to settle for a 
defensive doctrine in the interim.49  In either case, Rafsanjani seems to be highlighting a 
fundamental position to be able to absorb a first-strike while maintaining a credible 
second strike capability.  From the fifth, sixth, and seventh propositions, I conclude that 
Iran envisions itself as a status quo state, with ultimate aspirations for a nuclear deterrent 
doctrine but willing to settle for a defensive doctrine while it builds its arsenal to a 
survivable quantity. 
3. Nuclear Doctrine Theory: A Second Cut  
Building upon Posen’s work and adapting his propositions to explain 
unconventional weapons doctrine, Scott Sagan articulated four of his own balance of 
power propositions for selecting doctrine.50  Sagan’s four proposals are:  
• Realism suggests leaders of stronger military powers, when confronting a 
weaker military power, will consider preventive war to stop 
unconventional weapons development. 
• Maintenance of a “secure retaliatory capability” is a requirement for 
deterrence.   
• There is disagreement as to whether a balanced race between two powers 
increases or decreases the likelihood of conventional military aggression.  
• Realism suggests that first use of unconventional weapons is plausible to 
defend exposed allies that cannot be protected other ways.   
 Sagan’s contribution with these propositions is to update Posen’s work to account 
for specific constraints in nuclear balance of power theory, as opposed to general realism, 
dealing with the conventional military doctrines Posen studied in Sources of Doctrine.  
Sagan’s theoretical predictions can help the analyst understand doctrinal evolution among 
established nuclear weapons states when their strategic environment changes as potential 
adversaries begin their own programs and eventually achieve nuclear parity.  Another 
                                                 
49 See Avery Goldstein, “Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: Theoretical Explanation and China’s 
National Experience,” in The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results, ed. 
Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 227-30. Although China arrived at a 
self-reliance solution differently than has Iran, the Chinese developed an incremental approach to maintain 
a strong conventional defense while it built a nuclear weapons deterrent force as well. 
50 See Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine,” 25-26. 
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consideration is if, say, Iran were to break out of the NPT and evolve its nuclear doctrine 
as a deterrent shield to change the status quo.  In this scenario, Iran would be essentially 
blackmailing its neighbors with a nuclear deterrent to access whatever objective it 
attached to it, such as claiming drilling or petroleum infrastructure rights in the Caspian.  
While this scenario is not entirely out of the question, Iran’s state pronouncements thus 
far do not support the quick development of an expansionist, offensive conventional 
doctrine shielded by a nuclear deterrent; nor does its economic and military readiness 
capabilities. 
Three of Sagan’s propositions pertain to Iran’s case:51 
• Leaders of Stronger Military Powers, When Confronting a Weaker 
Military Power, will Consider Preventive War to Stop Unconventional 
Weapons Development.   
If the leader rejects preemptive war, it is because of a rational calculation of cost 
exceeding benefit, not because of any “moral qualms.”  Since Iran is not an established 
nuclear power and is not engaged in a mutual deterrence situation, this proposal is only 
relevant in a discussion about how the United States might react to Iran if it is publicly 
discovered to be developing nuclear weapons.  How the United States might respond is 
complicated by the fact that Iran is a signatory to the NPT and NPT nuclear states are not 
permitted to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear NPT signatories in “good 
standing.”52   
• Maintenance of a “Secure Retaliatory Capability” is a Requirement for 
Deterrence.   
The state may need to accept “mutual deterrence” until such time as it can 
produce a survivable, second strike capability.  This proposition reveals a likely difficulty 
for Iran if it is hoping to develop a nuclear deterrent posture; if it cannot guarantee the 
survival of its nuclear weapons in a first-strike, it cannot have an effective deterrent.  
Because of Iran’s relatively large size and rugged terrain, it could protect its force by 
                                                 
22 See Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine,” 25-6. Sagan’s fourth proposition, “first use of 
unconventional weapons is plausible to defend exposed allies that cannot be protected in other ways,” 
refers to a large nuclear patron responsible for the security guarantee of multiple satellite states in 
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disbursing its weapons production, storage, and assembly facilities.  The mountainous 
terrain throughout the southwest and southeast could provide survivable underground 
shelters; similar to those North Korea has built.53  The engineering effort and the cost for 
such a basing strategy would make it a long-term project to complete. 
• Does a Balanced Race Between Two Powers Increase or Decrease the 
Likelihood of Conventional Military Aggression?    
If, for instance, two states that have a second strike capability and maintain a 
balanced mutual deterrence, does the fear of nuclear escalation make conventional war 
more or less likely?  This leads into “the stability/instability paradox,” coined by Glenn 
Snyder, wherein states with a stable, mutual deterrence use their unconventional arsenal 
as a shield for conventional-based expansionism.54  Iran’s weapons production capacity, 
especially at first, would make it difficult to achieve a “balanced race” with either Israel 
or the United States.  If Iran could achieve nuclear parity with Pakistan, however, Iranian 
alternatives open for dealing with Pakistan’s Sunni-Shi’a violence.  Since the rise of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the IRGC has monitored anti-Shi’a violence within 
Pakistan and along the Iranian border.55  The IRGC assumes itself as protector of the 
world’s Shi’a; if Iran no longer felt deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear forces, it could feel 
more confident to intervene on behalf of Pakistan’s Shi’a, or to deal with anti-Iranian 
groups operating out of Pakistan.  From Iran’s perspective, the United States has proven 
averse to challenging states militarily once they have declared a nuclear capability, but it 
is more aggressive to states displaying nuclear intent.  The principal lesson Iran seems to 
have drawn is that U.S. policy favored diplomacy for North Korea and regime change for 
Iraq.56  Iran may view nuclear weapons as the key ingredient for Iran to deter the United 
States and wield greater political leverage for its agenda within the Persian Gulf region. 
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4. The Case for Iran 
The strategic environment created by the nuclear neighborhood in which Iran 
resides creates incentives for Iran to adopt a deterrence doctrine through an asymmetrical 
unconventional weapons advantage.  Unable to secure balancing alliances or security 
guarantees during its war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iran found itself in the ultimate “self-
help” situation for systemic state security.  Although Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khomeini scrubbed the shah’s nuclear program in 1979, lackluster international outrage 
to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons on Iranian forces persuaded Khomeini to approve 
development and use of chemical weapons followed by expansion into biological and 
nuclear weapons programs.57  Iran’s grand strategy is to be a status quo state capable of 
deterring potential aggressors while it works to improve its own economic conditions.  To 
support this strategy, Iran is growing its military capabilities to fulfill a deterrence 
doctrine, once it can assure a secure second strike capability. 
B. IRAN’S THREAT PERCEPTIONS 
Forced to balance against regional threats by itself (rather than through alliances), 
Iran developed its grand strategy to ensure its survival through self-reliance.  Mistrustful 
of international organizations, Iran is now reluctant to jeopardize self-reliance in favor of 
any form of collective security.  Iran’s strategic environment no longer resembles what it 
did after the Iraq war, yet Tehran is reluctant to alter its strategy for fear of losing power.  
Iran embarked on the nuclear deterrence path to maintain its sovereignty, but also 
to assert political power within the region.  Such political power is often referred to as 
“prestige,” without an adequate definition of what prestige means in this context.58    
George Perkovich suggests that nuclear weapons may be seen by Supreme Leader 
Khamenei and his advisors “as an almost magical source of national power and 
autonomy.”59  Given Iran’s strategic position linking the Persian Gulf and the Caspian 
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Sea, it is conceivable that Iran seeks to be the political equal of other regional nuclear 
powers and still remain a status quo state.  Although Iran’s war with, and the preeminent 
rise of, Iraq was a formative motivation for nuclear weapons, losing Iraq as a direct threat 
does not remove its interest in nuclear weapons.  As each normative threat to Iran has 
been redressed, Israel and the United States have grown more prominent in Iran’s 
security calculations to fill the void. 
1. Caspian Region and Central Asia 
Afghanistan is mired in reconstruction and civil war, as are many of the Caspian 
states.  The major threat to Iran’s northern and eastern frontier is centered on rival 
sectarian violence, drug smuggling, and other illicit trade activities.  From its shared 
borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan, Iran faces no more of a threat 
than black market or drug cartel thugs with small arms.60  Turkey is a conventional force 
with interests in controlling Kurdish groups in northwest Iran, but no territorial 
aspirations that constitute an existential threat.  Russia’s assistance to Iran’s nuclear 
energy program virtually assures Iran will stay out of Russian disputes with Chechnya 
and other Caucasus states; none of those internal struggles overtly threaten Iran.   
Especially in the cases of Pakistan and Turkey, however, ascendance of a nuclear-
weaponized Iran might trigger frictions that currently do not exist.  That is, Iran’s mere 
possession of nuclear weapons could spur a new round of proliferation (Turkey) and 
escalation (Pakistan).   
2. The Gulf States 
Most of the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, are in economic free-fall and 
political survival mode.  None have a coherent military capability that presents a serious 
threat to Iran.  Moreover, Iran has cultivated strengthening relationships with many of the 
smaller Gulf States, such as Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have all 
expanded economic relationships with Iran since the end of the Ian-Iraq War in 1988.  
Even Iran’s island territory dispute with the Emirates has begun to fade, but the sudden 
emergence of a Nuclear Iran will send the Gulf States clamoring to the United States for a 
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greater security guarantee that will elevate U.S.-Iran tensions even further.61  The likely 
American response would be an even larger military presence in the Gulf, aimed 
specifically at Iran.  This is an outcome “Iran seeks to avoid” more than virtually any 
other, as it would increase the U.S. military presence and undermine the Gulf 
relationships it has worked so hard to grow.  Further, Gulf States that doubt the U.S. 
commitment to their security could also acquire nuclear weapons to add an arms race 
dynamic within the region for which Iran is not prepared.  
3. Vague Threats 
Balance of power only really applies in the context of existential threats to the 
state; in Iran’s case, George Perkovich reduces this realm to “four vague threats.”62  
Written as Operation Iraqi Freedom was under way, Perkovich’s four include Iraq, 
Pakistan, Israel, and the United States.  With the U.S.-imposed regime change in Iraq, 
Baghdad can no longer pose such a threat to Iran.  Pakistan may have assisted Iran in its 
nuclear program as a tacit assurance that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are meant solely for 
India.63  Even if there is no bilateral understanding, Pakistan is too preoccupied with 
India to have grand designs against the Islamic Republic.  That leaves Israel and the 
United States as the only remaining existential threats to Iran.64 
Israel, for its part is mainly interested in Iran as it evolves as a nuclear power.  
Iran has avoided direct confrontation with Israel, choosing instead to fund and support 
proxy conflict with Israel through pro-Palestinian terrorist organizations like Hezbollah 
and Hamas.65  Israel has restrained itself from reacting directly to Iran, but the potential 
introduction of nuclear weapons into a terrorist relationship changes Israel’s outlook.  
Israel is now acquiring aircraft and submarines with the range and capabilities to hold 
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Iranian targets at risk.66  As suggested earlier, the irony for Iran is that if not for its 
nuclear program, ostensibly to counter Israel and the United States, it would not be a 
target at all.  Even its support of terrorist organizations is unlikely to make Iran the target 
possessing nuclear weapons would.  Short of terrorist action conducted directly from 
Iranian territory against Israel or the United States, the West is likely to continue dealing 
with Iran’s terror connections diplomatically.  The weapon Iran proclaims will at last 
bring it security is likely the one program that will make it the least secure. 
The U.S. influence in the Gulf has grown considerably since 2001.  With forces 
stationed in Afghanistan, South Asia, Turkey, many Gulf States, and now Iraq, U.S. 
military power has virtually encircled Iran.  This “massive projection of American 
power” and the continued rhetorical confrontation between Washington and Tehran 
“constitute Iran’s foremost strategic dilemma.”67  Although Iran’s actual security has 
been increased by the removal of Iraq and Afghanistan as sectarian, if not existential 
threats, it feels more threatened than at any time since the end of the war with Iraq.  Even 
though Iraq represented a much more realistic threat to Iran’s security than the United 
States, it was still a non-nuclear Iraq.  Now to be surrounded by what is arguably the 
world’s rising hegemonic power, supported by unprecedented conventional and nuclear 
capabilities changes the security dynamic with what Iran views as a double standard.  
Iran feels a need to assert itself as the regional hegemon, in the great Persian tradition, yet 
the United States is there, seemingly arbitrarily deciding who may possess nuclear 
weapons and who may not.68  This inflated threat perception is supported by Iranian 
statements and media.  Although the United States may not pose a direct threat, Iran’s 
perception is fueled by rampant nationalism every time a U.S. official talks about the 
“axis of evil,” or “regime change.”  As Iran’s former finance minister under the shah, 
Jahangir Amuzegar warns, “any U.S. strategy that even remotely raises the specter of 
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foreign interference in Iran is doomed to fail.”69  Iran will act on its threat perceptions.  
The United States should do what it can to not enhance the perception of itself as a direct 
military or indirect diplomatic threat to the regime in Tehran or it risks cementing Iran’s 
nuclear doctrine and pushing Iran across the nuclear threshold. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
By examining the predicted outcomes for Posen’s seven doctrinal propositions 
against Iran’s strategic environment, we are able to gain a better understanding of Iran’s 
military doctrine aspirations which in turn, identify certain “levers” on the systemic level 
that U.S. policy must address to be successful.  The following list of three policy 
suggestions is not inclusive, but is highlighted by Iran’s threat perceptions and apparent 
strategic goals.  U.S. policy should foster an Iranian reevaluation of its threat 
environment so Tehran can conclude on its own that it should opt for another security 
solution.  This is easier said than done on the systemic level.  In order to effect systemic 
change diplomatically, Iran has to be willing to reciprocate.  Aside from the trade and 
cooperation agreement Iran and the European Union have negotiated, Iran has responded 
to few diplomatic entreaties.  The following tracks can help set the stage for further talks 
and openings for policy initiatives aimed at sub-national levels.70 
1. Reduce Threat Perceptions  
International discourse impacts the threat environment.  Post September 11th U.S. 
policy has rightfully concerned Tehran: U.S. president George Bush’s “axis of evil” 
speech characterized Iran in terms difficult to overcome.  Separate promises to change 
any regime affiliated with terrorist organizations undercut any incentive for Iran to 
comply with U.S. demands to abandon its nuclear program.  What Jahangir Amuzegar 
calls “unsubstantiated accusations and implied threats” have prevented U.S. policymakers 
from dissuading Iran from building nuclear weapons because they undermine their own 
efforts by offering alternative sticks, without offering any carrots.71 
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First, the United States must not appear so imposing on Iran.  Specifically, public 
pronouncements advocating regime change and Undersecretary of State John Bolton’s 
remark to “draw the appropriate lessons from Iraq,” stoke fiery Iranian nationalism and 
“buttress the position” of Iran’s hardliners.72  Resurgences in Iranian nationalism merely 
breathe new life into the ruling conservatives, prolonging their crumbling grip on 
power.73  This does not mean that the United States should end any of its current missions 
in the Persian Gulf or South Asia; it means that the United States needs to go publicly 
silent with aimless, inflammatory rhetoric.   
Second, the Unites States should lead a new multilateral coalition on a hard 
diplomatic tack against Iran.74  By enlisting the EU, Russia, Japan, and as many Gulf 
States as possible, the coalition would take away Iran’s ability to play one nation against 
another to forestall referral to the UN Security Council, or worse.  Such a coalition would 
even out the threat posture of each state; the United States would no longer be seen as the 
sole “bad cop” to Europe’s “good cop,” for instance. 
The new coalition would be positioned to enact multilateral containment or award 
multilateral carrots, depending on Iran’s response.  This means that hard talk should be 
reserved for bilateral and multilateral diplomatic communications and it should clearly 
spell out a carrot and stick relationship.  Some Iranian diplomats are afraid that even if 
they ratify the NPT additional protocol, “more demands will be forthcoming and that 
such concessions will open the door for the U.S. to seek regime change.”75  The U.S.-led 
coalition must demonstrate good faith by not using Iran’s acquiescence to one set of 
conditions as a departure point for more demands, but it must also unwaveringly hold the 
line on Iran’s nonproliferation commitments. 
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2. Minimize Israeli Threat Posture 
The United States must address Iran’s threat perception of Israel.  Iranian leaders 
have quietly hinted that they would also accept any settlement the Palestinians were 
willing to accept.  President Khatami remarked that the Palestinians themselves must 
“determine their future.”  Addressing why Iran would never directly intervene in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, Supreme Leader Khamenei declared that the Palestinian issue “is 
simply not Iran’s Jihad.”76  The United States should play on this sentiment and do all it 
can to revive the Israeli peace roadmap.  Removing the Israeli-Palestinian question from 
the Iranian debate should be a top priority for the United States.  The U.S.-led coalition 
should also pressure Iran to publicly support the process to signal the Palestinian 
Authority and Hezbollah that it is time to end the stalemate.  
The United States can also do more to “equalize” its security guarantee among the 
Arab states and Israel.  By applying a more even hand in supporting the Gulf States and 
Israel, the United States can reduce the impression of a double standard.  This is not to 
say Washington should curb its support for Israel.  But it must appear to give Israel the 
same treatment as all its other allies; special treatment for Israel calls into question the 
utility of any U.S. security guarantee for the other states. 
Iran is also concerned about what it perceives as an Israeli nuclear deterrent.  
Whether or not Israel has nuclear weapons is irrelevant: Iran perceives such a threat, and 
that is its reality.  The United States must clarify the role of Israel’s entire military 
capability in relation to the region’s overwhelming conventional capabilities arrayed 
against Israel.  This must include gentle articulation that no form of Israeli deterrent can 
be removed until Iran (and others) publicly renounces support for anti-Israeli terrorist 
organizations and acknowledge Israel’s right to exist.  This does not mean Iran and the 
Arab states cannot oppose Israeli policies, or must “abandon the Palestinians;” but they 
cannot expect to change the strategic environment by covertly threatening Israel while 
also demanding Israel disarm.77  Here also the new coalition must convince Iran that any 
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continued Arab opposition will only be accepted in diplomatic realms, and Iran can lead 
the Arab states in the discussion. 
3. Encourage a Gulf Security Organization 
To reassure Tehran that there is no preplanned agenda against it, the United States 
should clearly articulate its plan for post-Saddam Iraq and encourage formation of a new 
Gulf Council working group.  Such a working group would lay a foundation to establish 
new cooperative norms and mechanisms for collective security and common defense that 
includes an active Iran.  The group would include all the Gulf Cooperative Council 
member states plus authorities from the new Iraqi government and Iran.  Joseph 
McMillan, of Washington’s National Defense University, points out “the lack of an 
enduring political basis for cooperation has been the Achilles heel of previous efforts” in 
this regard.78  Still, by helping re-establish Persian leadership in the region, the United 
States could find ways to decrease its Persian Gulf military commitments.    The United 
States should minimize its visible presence in these proceedings, ensuring its perspective 
and interests are represented by proxy through Gulf or European allies.  This would do 
much to allay fears among Gulf States and Iran about the direction of their regional 
strategic environment.79 
These three broad proposals may be difficult to start, but they each would do 
much to begin sculpting the regional strategic environment and allow Iran to make an 
honest reassessment of its threat perceptions.  Only then can the systemic forces that 
influence Iran’s military doctrine begin to change its strategic requirements. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Iran views itself as a target of the United States and Israel.  Iranian officials make 
public announcements that illustrate or hint towards how Iran views its strategic 
environment, and how it views its military doctrine.  In some instances, Iranian officials 
use the terms “defensive” and “deterrent” interchangeably, but it is clear they understand 
the difference when Chairman Rafsanjani articulates a “deterrent capability” able to 
withstand a first-strike to act as a deterrent to further attack.  Iran’s strategic situation—                                                 
78 See Joseph McMillan, “The United States and a Gulf Security Architecture: Policy Considerations,” 
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its relative size, economic and industrial power, neighboring threats—help identify it as a 
“small, status quo state.”  As such, it fulfills the doctrinal role predicted by Posen and 
Sagan in their respective balance of power models.   
It is evident that Iran views the security threats in its region differently than the 
rest of the world does; but in that context, Iran sees itself as an aspiring great power with 
a status quo strategy, supported by a defensive military doctrine.  Because the nature of 
the threats Iran perceives, namely a nuclear United States and Israel, a defensive doctrine 
can only be successful with a counter-force or counter-value nuclear weapon capability.  
What we can infer from prominent Iranian pronouncements, is they view their doctrine as 
defensive, but they hope or plan to develop that doctrine into a strategic deterrent when 
they can support it with the appropriate number of weapons systems. 
Iran is not likely to change its strategic view unless it perceives a demonstrable 
change in the environment.  The fall of Ba’thist Iraq may be one such change; progress 
on the Israeli peace process may be another.  By working towards the policy implications 
identified in this study, the United States and Israel can subtly change the strategic 
landscape and help Iran to reassess its threat perceptions.  Only then can Iran reach its 
own conclusions for its security requirements and alter its strategy, and by extension, its 
military doctrine.  Once it changes its strategy, Iran can then readdress its security 
approach; to emphasize collective security or defensive alliances and obviate a “need” for 
nuclear weapons. 
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III. IRAN’S NATIONALIST MYTH MAKERS  
Iran’s public nuclear face is contradictory.  Ministers within the Islamic 
government invariably proclaim Iran’s peaceful intentions for its nuclear power program.  
However, when international rhetoric hints at a threat to Iran’s sovereignty, one or 
another hardliner will promise a military reprisal that would be impossible without a 
weapon of mass destruction.80  Even without admitting to having such a weapon, the 
hardliners betray their faith in overwhelming technological military capability to assure 
Iran’s security.  Recurring references to overwhelming military power, real or imagined, 
illustrate two inner beliefs among the ruling hardline conservatives.  First, that such 
capabilities will provide the security worthy of Iran by holding Israeli and U.S. forces at 
risk with equal capabilities, and second, such statements reveal a political insecurity, an 
envy, they believe can be overcome only by being in the “nuclear club.”  For individual 
beliefs to influence Iranian policy individual actors within the government must be 
important; their contributions must “matter.”  Examination at the individual level of 
analysis yields a model that shows how individual actions influence state behavior in the 
international realm. 
Iran is torn between two competing nuclear weapons myths, functionally allowing 
the supreme leader to hedge his nuclear ambitions.  In this chapter, I argue that these two 
nuclear myths influence Iran’s consensus-building and decision making.  Individual 
beliefs and attitudes toward Iran’s security have taken hold at different governmental 
levels to inspire Iran’s nuclear power and nuclear weapons programs.  The chapter 
explores Iran’s two nuclear myths and the individual myth makers that perpetuate them to 
drive Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  First, I define the relationship of nuclear myths to 
proliferation.  Second, I illustrate how Iran employs two countervailing myths to 
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simultaneously inspire the nuclear program and to insulate it.  Finally, I explore policy 
options to discredit Iran’s security myth by fostering and educating an internal debate 
within Iran.   
The precarious balance Iran employs with its dual myths protects administrators 
and scientists within the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI),81 as well as Iran’s 
nuclear technology suppliers.  By publicly embracing the “nuclear insecurity” myth and 
affirming its support of the NPT, Iran is able to continue its relationship with its chief 
suppliers, Russia and China, while obviating public debate over the utility of nuclear 
weapons.  Lying underneath outward appearances, though, the “nuclear security” myth is 
the inspiration for military leaders and technicians secretly working on the weapons 
program to succeed for the greater good of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Because the 
Iranian government has also perpetuated the insecurity myth, U.S. policy should try to 
exploit anti-nuclear inertia within the Iranian debate without appearing to be dictating 
Iran’s interests or position. 
Iran’s nuclear weapons program is too complex to have spontaneously generated.  
As chapter II details, the strategic environment in which Iran found itself in the mid-
1980s was dominated by Iraq on one side and the threat of Soviet expansion beyond its 
war with Afghanistan on the other.  Iraq’s ruthless use of chemical weapons against the 
ill-prepared Iranian forces was a formative experience for Iran.  By the end of the war in 
1988, several governmental and military leaders were advocates of acquiring and using 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.  Chapter IV relates how a coalition of ruling 
clerics and military officers convinced Ayatollah Khomeini to resume a nuclear weapons 
program in 1984, reversing his 1979 decree that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic.82  The 
core of Iran’s nuclear myth makers evolved from that coalition in 1984.  Abu Mohammed 
Asgar-Khani and Hashemi Rafsanjani were part of the governmental coalition that led the 
transformation.  Having cultivated international isolation, Iran had little luck generating 
international sympathy for its plight in its war with Iraq.  Unable to overcome shortages 
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of conventional military hardware and spare parts, Iran was forced to transform itself into 
a self-sufficient military power to provide its own defense.  Iran’s nuclear myth makers 
provide the inspiration to succeed in Iran’s clandestine weapons and delivery system 
programs. 
A. NUCLEAR MYTHS, MYTH MAKERS, AND PROLIFERATION 
Noted nuclear strategy specialist Peter Lavoy developed the “nuclear myths” 
model to explain individual-level causes of proliferation, which forms the theoretical 
basis for this analysis.83  Used in this context, nuclear myths are “unverifiable beliefs 
about relationships between a state’s nuclear weapons and security.”  Nuclear myths are 
unverifiable because they rely on perceptions of what creates security: “they can be 
believed but not known.”  Because there is no modern experience with nuclear warfare or 
how a state can prevail within it, these perceptions are theory-based rather than 
empirically-based.84  Lavoy describes nuclear myth makers as “individuals who assert 
these myths and try to persuade others of their validity.”  They are societal elites that 
convince governmental leaders of the “military security and political power” provided by 
nuclear weapons.85   
In aspiring proliferant states, Lavoy contends that myth makers can persuade 
government decision makers to “go nuclear” by “exaggerating security threats to make a 
‘myth of nuclear security’ more compelling.”  The security myth emphasizes a state’s 
international standing with respect to nuclear security alliances and the threatening nature 
of its strategic environment.  If “well-placed” individuals can convince state leaders their 
security and political power will be enhanced by nuclear weapons, the state is likely to 
acquire them.  This formula is also prescriptive for nonproliferation.  Governmental 
insiders can emphasize and foster a consensus on the “insecurity myth” of nuclear 
weapons to influence leaders to not seek nuclear weapons.86  The insecurity myth 
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emphasizes the vulnerabilities to which a state opens itself when it produces nuclear 
weapons, such as industrial and ecological erosion; the financial burdens for security, 
testing, development, maintenance, and disposal; and the political vulnerability to attack 
by larger nuclear states simply because the first government’s acquisition constituted a 
new threat to the larger power.   
1. Myth Making Assumptions 
The operational utility of this model depends on three assumptions germane to 
individuals and national policy development:87  
• Individual beliefs matter for foreign policy making. 
• Policymakers’ beliefs in nuclear weapons are particularly important. 
• Talented and well-placed individuals can help create, diffuse, and 
perpetuate nuclear myths. 
These assumptions do not necessarily run counter to other theories of 
international relations (e.g., realism, bureaucratic politics).  Rather, they are instructive of 
how leaders decide specific policy paths; supplementing insight where other analytical 
lenses cannot define the same events through its resultant filter.  In nearly every state-
level decision, the individual leader has final authority on the course of action.  His 
decision is influenced by his perceptions, understanding (or lack of it), and beliefs about 
“the political and military characteristics” of nuclear weapons.88  Lavoy proposes that 
individual beliefs in foreign policy can explain why different leaders in similar situations 
acted “differently,” or why people in different situations acted “similarly.”89 
Policymakers’ beliefs are particularly important because much of nuclear political 
interaction depends heavily on perception and intuition.  The realm of nuclear 
brinksmanship is fraught with nuance, as opposed to the “brute force” of conventional 
military battles.  Modern political outcomes depend on “highly subjective assessments;” 
miscalculations can cost the political leader his entire societal context—he could lose the 
population he is entrusted to defend.90  Nuclear myths influence the cost-benefit calculus 
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88 Ibid., 200. 
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behind the decision to proliferate.  If a state breaks out from the NPT, it must recognize 
the cost the regime can impose for noncompliance.   
Finally, “well-placed” myth makers can have tremendous influence when policy 
makers recognize they do not possess the required understanding to make an accurate 
judgment.  “Even when national leaders feel confident in their strategic beliefs, experts 
can influence the process of policy making.”91  When experts have the access and the 
wherewithal to influence government leaders, the leaders shape their own beliefs based 
on the advice they receive.  If the myth maker is persistent and convincing, he can shape 
the national strategic direction. 
2. Applying the Assumptions to Iran 
Iran’s governing style is particularly susceptible to influential elites, perhaps more 
so than in democratically run institutions.  Even though Iran is autocratic, its decision 
making is dependent on consensus building and political horse trading within complex 
informal networks.  There is no open political process with procedural checks to limit the 
ruling elites’ options.  Iran’s foreign policy decision making is often the result of 
compromises among the overlapping security institutions and their overseeing 
bureaucrats.92  Once a decision is made, it is enforced with authoritarian efficiency, but 
the process is open to private discussion where certain elites can hold tremendous sway.   
Individuals and administrators all vie for influence at the highest levels, 
depending on personal networks and affiliations through family, school, religion, or 
military service.  Most ministers are appointed based on personal influence, rather than 
merit.  Given a general lack of experience in many decision making positions, these 
bureaucrats can be slow to render decisions and are likely to seek advice from trusted 
colleagues.  What decision makers believe and what they are told by trusted associates 
bears greatly on the policies they shape.   
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Tehran University Professor Nasser Hadian writes that Iranian nuclear decisions 
are made at the “ideological intersection of Islam and nationalism.”93  Iran’s leaders may 
be growing more pragmatic, but issues that resonate with popular nationalism help them 
maintain their grip on power.  The nuclear myth makers appeal to nationalism and 
popular will while convincing leaders of the security void only nuclear weapons can fill.  
Iran’s nuclear myth makers exaggerate the balance of power security imperative for 
national self-help and transform industry bureaucracies into parochial survivalists which 
sustain the security myth for their own self-preservation.  Most importantly, individual 
beliefs and the placement of experts within the regime are the critical combination to 
influence Iranian policy decisions.   
B. IRAN’S COUNTER OPPOSING NUCLEAR MYTHS 
Lavoy illustrates two opposing nuclear myths.  Iran is successfully employing 
both simultaneously.  Targeted to two different audiences, Iran uses variations of both the 
security and the insecurity myths to achieve complementary ends.  The security myth is 
closely guarded, known mainly to those decision makers inside Supreme Leader 
Khamenei’s inner circle and the few workers who know to what end their labor is 
contributing.  On the other hand, the insecurity myth is invoked regularly by every 
minister involved with the AEOI and the present debate about Iran’s role in the NPT.   
1. The Nuclear Security Myth 
The Iranian version of the security myth stresses the need for Iranian self-reliance.  
From its own perspective, Iran’s greatest rhetorical threat is Israel, followed by its 
“imperialist sponsor,” the United States.94  The security myth emphasizes, by way of 
exaggeration, the danger posed by these two nuclear powers against the Islamic republic.  
Iranian security myth makers are rarely heard outside closed door sessions.  However, 
there have been enough “leaks” from influential personalities to suggest they are not 
accidental.  Such “leaks” may be intentional messages to administrators or bureaus within 
                                                 
93 See Nasser Hadian, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contexts and Debates,” in Iran’s Bomb: American and 
Iranian Perspectives, ed., Geoffrey Kemp (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 2004): 56.  
94 By rhetorical threat, I refer to how Iran features Israel, or “the Zionist regime” as the primary threat 
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other states may present a more realistic security threat, Iran can get more mileage by isolating the Jewish 
state opposite the Muslim world. See Perkovich, Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Challenge, 5-6. 
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the Iranian government, but are publicly dismissed as inconsequential loose talk.  Iran’s 
security myth has four elements: 
• Iran is at risk from Aggressive Zionist/Israeli and American nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons. 
• Iran has no great-power alliance options, no nuclear umbrella, and cannot 
rely on international treaties or norms for protection. 
• Iran is descended from the great Persian society and is destined to be the 
leader within the Persian Gulf region. 
• Self-reliance producing nuclear weapons is the only way to ensure Iran 
can meet the threats posed by Israel and the United States.95 
Among Iranians, there is a nuance to the nuclear question.  Some circles only see 
a need for Iran to develop the capability to produce nuclear weapons without actually 
doing it unless a more definitive threat looms.96  Other circles think Iran should develop 
and stockpile nuclear weapons to ensure an existing military capability for its security.  
The security myth serves both of these positions equally, since the capacity to produce 
weapons also satisfies the requirement of self-reliance. 
2. The Nuclear Insecurity Myth 
The Iranian version of the insecurity myth also has four elements, the fourth being 
more of a legitimacy clause for Iran’s right to produce civilian nuclear energy.  Most 
reformist politicians repeat the insecurity myth at every opportunity.  The underlying role 
of the insecurity myth is to keep all parliamentarians and ministers “on message” as to 
Iran’s nuclear intentions: 
• Nuclear weapons go against Islam; their possession will weaken the 
Islamic republic’s ideological standing and erode its regional leadership 
claim.  
• Nuclear weapons will undermine Iran’s international commitments, arouse 
suspicion, and invite animosity from its neighbors and competitors.  The 
economic cost of nuclear weapons, from lost trade and actual expenses to 
maintain the stockpile, outweighs their benefit in a wartime role. 
                                                 
95 These themes are consistent with Shahram Chubin’s propositions of Iranian nuclear weapon 
motives. See Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy, 53-4. See also Shahram Chubin, Whither Iran? 
Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security, Adelphi Paper 342 (New York: Oxford, 2002),74. 
96 See Hadian, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 61-3.  Hadian discusses three sub-options: independent fuel 
cycle for reactor; capability to produce a bomb if necessary; and actually producing a nuclear stockpile. 
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• Rather than provide security against other nuclear weapons powers, Iran’s 
nuclear weapons will in fact make it vulnerable to external attack merely 
because it has such weapons.97 
• Because it is not Iran’s purpose to develop nuclear weapons, but it is their 
right under the NPT to develop civilian power production, Iran must be 
allowed to develop an indigenous fuel cycle to prevent dependence on any 
foreign source for its electrical power.98 
The insecurity myth has the larger following of the two myths in Iran because it is 
the foundation to official government policy: nonproliferation while developing an 
indigenous fuel cycle capability for a civilian atomic energy program. 
3. Iran’s Nuclear Strategy 
Iran’s overall nuclear strategy is to publicly disavow any interest in nuclear 
weapons while developing every allowable capability under Article IV of the NPT.99  
Reacting to IAEA and U.S. allegations of cheating on its NPT obligations, Iran is 
adopting whatever tactic will work to stall and divert attention away from its program.  
The longer Iran can stall the IAEA, the more of its fissile material upgrade production it 
can develop.  The real goal for Iran appears to be to hedge nuclear weapons development 
until a time that Leader Khamenei deigns appropriate to fully cross the nuclear threshold.  
The evidence for this mounts while Khamenei appears to be aloof, indecisive, or 
supremely clever.  
The myths help keep Supreme Leader Khamenei from having to commit to a 
specific path until he feels Iran is ready.  Iran’s official position is to support its NPT 
obligations, but there is evidence that Iran is clandestinely trying to reach a weapons 
capability.  Former Iranian foreign minister under the shah, Ardeshir Zahedi, recently 
wrote that “the present regime in Tehran is strategically committed to developing a 
                                                 
97 See Hadian, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 60-61. 
98 See “Iran is Determined to Develop Nuclear Technology: Mohammed Khatami,” Iran Press Service 
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nuclear ‘surge capacity’ if not a full arsenal of weapons.”100  In April 2004, the National 
Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) reported that Iran has convened a secret nuclear 
weapons effort, functioning outside the IAEA and under control of the Iranian military.  
The group’s summary states that the Iranian government views the United States as 
having no choice but to “go soft on Iran,” because of U.S. preoccupation with Iraq.101  
The report further claims that Iran is trying to rush completion of a nuclear weapon in 
less than two years.  The NCRI is the same group that reported the secret facilities at 
Natanz and Arak in 2002, which were confirmed by the Iranian government to the IAEA 
in 2003; although this latest claim has yet to be confirmed, the group’s proven record 
lends credibility to the story.   
An unrelated report in August 2004 from an Israeli daily paper, Ma’ariv 
International, seemed to confirm the NCRI allegations.102  The Israeli paper reported it 
had confirmed through “Western intelligence sources” that Tehran has decided to risk a 
“showdown” with the United States rather than concede any nuclear capabilities.  The 
report details an elaborate scheme by Iranian leaders to quickly produce enough highly 
enriched uranium to produce a bomb by stalling the IAEA.  The report alleges that a 
special meeting of top Iranian leaders, including former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
concluded that the Europeans will favor appeasement over confrontation.  Further, 
Tehran intends to exploit Europe’s “lack of will” while exerting pressure on the United 
States with renewed Shi’a resistance fighting in Iraq, led by Shiite cleric Moqtada al 
Sadr.  The report asserts the Iranian leadership deliberately used Ayatollah al Sistani’s 
medical treatment in London as a “window of opportunity” to instigate an escalation by 
al Sadr’s private militia against U.S. forces in Iraq.  
Iran’s underlying nuclear weapons strategy is to hedge: to shield capabilities 
development behind the NPT until it decides to withdraw from the NPT and go nuclear or 
it decides to rollback nuclear weapons capabilities in favor of collective security and                                                  
100 See Ardeshir Zahedi, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Wall Street Journal (25 June 2004): A10. As the 
shah’s foreign minister, Zahedi signed the NPT on behalf of Iran. 
101 See David Ensor, “Iran ‘Rushing to Build Nuke Bomb,’” CNN.com (27 April 2004), available 
from: http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/27/iran.nuclear/; Internet, accessed August 2004. 
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Information Service (FBIS) GMP20040812000083 (12 August 2004). 
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economic arrangements.103  Israeli nuclear scholar Ariel Levite argues that a hedging 
strategy allows state leaders to pursue weapons capabilities without making a final 
decision regarding acquisition or abandonment until political conditions dictate.104  In 
fact, any final decision whether to actually develop a bomb may not happen until the very 
last minute for either course of action.  Inherent deniability gives the regime bargaining 
power for any negotiations while allowing Iran’s nuclear suppliers to continue to legally 
assist the state in its nuclear development under the terms of the NPT. 
C. IRAN’S NUCLEAR SECURITY MYTH MAKERS 
Iran’s myth makers are particularly effective because of their longevity in 
government, their extensive interpersonal network, and their ideological devotion.  
Unlike India or Pakistan, whose myth makers were scientists, Iran’s myth makers are 
clerics turned politicians.  Iran’s scientists do not have the continuity within government 
to have the influence required of a myth maker.  In fact, many of Iran’s scientists fled the 
country after the revolution and Tehran has spent the last fifteen years educating a new 
generation of scientists and technicians.   
Most of the ruling clerics have been involved in the Islamic government since 
before the revolution and have held several positions within the Majlis or various other 
councils.  Their political longevity ensures each have broad personal networks with 
which to negotiate consensus and peddle influence.  Further, each of these myth makers 
have cultivated an ideological reputation on which their followers have come to depend 
when discussing policy.  I have identified three primary figures that fulfill the security 
myth maker role inside Iran: Chairman of the Expediency Council Ayatollah Akbar 
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Hashemi Bahramani Rafsanjani, Former Prime Minister Doctor Abu Mohammed Asgar-
Khani, and IRGC Commander in Chief Yahya Rahim-Safavi.  Each are uniquely 
positioned to wield influence over separate segments of the Iranian government, yet each 
also fills a role that gives them access and influence with Supreme Leader Khamenei, 
arguably the final authority for any nuclear weapons decision. 
1. Chairman of the Expediency Council Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani 
Chairman Rafsanjani has been a revolutionary insider from the beginning.  One of 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s closest advisors after the revolution, Rafsanjani co-founded the 
Islamic Republican Party (IRP) which was the cornerstone of Iranian politics until 
1987.105  He was the speaker of the Majlis from 1980 – 1989 when, near the end of the 
Iraq war, Khomeini selected Rafsanjani to be the chief of the regular armed forces where 
he was instrumental in ending the wasteful human wave attacks.106  He rode his success 
after the war to two terms as Iran’s president, where he built a reputation as an economic 
reformer, stimulating the first growth and construction within Iran since the revolution.  
Since 1997, Rafsanjani has been the Chairman of the Expediency Council, considered to 
be the number two position to Ayatollah Khamenei.   
The Iraq war left a major impression on Rafsanjani; after the war he became the 
most consistent proponent of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.  In an address to 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in October, 1988, right after the war, he 
proclaimed: 
Chemical and biological weapons are poor man’s atomic bombs and can 
be easily produced. We should at least consider them for our defense. 
Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that 
international laws are just scraps of paper. With regard to chemical, 
bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear 
during the war that these weapons are very decisive . . . We should fully 
equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, 
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bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on you should make 
use of the opportunity and perform this task.107 
While reciting Friday prayers in December, 2001, Rafsanjani updated his public 
commitment to nuclear weapons and their use: “If a day comes when the world of Islam 
is duly equipped with the arms Israel has in possession, the strategy of colonialism would 
face a stalemate because application of an atomic bomb not leave anything in Israel but 
the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world.”108 
Rafsanjani’s unparalleled access to and influence with Supreme Leader Khamenei 
ensures he is always in position to keep the security myth alive with the leader; and his 
access to virtually all aspects of Iran’s governing functions also means he can focus the 
“troops” in any crisis.  Rafsanjani is unquestionably the lead security myth maker in the 
Islamic republic. 
2. Former Prime Minister Doctor Abu Mohammed Asgar-Khani  
Doctor Abu Mohammed Asgar-Khani was Prime Minister from 1980-1989; now 
a Tehran University International Relations Professor.  He is considered in many circles 
to be “The father of Iran’s nuclear program.” Asgar-Khani had been thought of as a 
pragmatist, he is “one the very few Iranians to state publicly that it is in Iran’s national 
interest to develop nuclear weapons.”109 
In an opinion piece that appeared in a Beirut paper in September, 2003, Asgar-
Khani addressed his opinion on the IAEA inspections at the newly discovered uranium 
processing plants in Natanz and Arak; and unabashedly reasserted his position that Iran 
should develop nuclear weapons: 
. . . Iran should invoke Article 10 of the NPT and consider those tests as 
“an extraordinary event” against the “supreme interest” of Iran and 
therefore should render notice to step out of the NPT before the NPT and 
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the CTBT monitoring systems and inspections regimes are in place. Iran 
failed to do so. That opportunity was lost and Iran has to pay the price . . .  
If you ask me if Iran needs to nuclearize itself, I would say this is a must 
for Iran’s strategy of survival. A nuclear Iran must not be seen as a threat 
to its neighboring countries or to Israel. The weapons would serve as a 
minimum deterrence for self-defense in a world of uncertainty. It is 
necessary not only as a substitute for fossil energy but also for Iran’s 
social cohesion and prestige . . . I would now argue that, only by 
becoming a nuclear weapons state, can Iran consolidate its social 
coherence. Iran needs both soft and hard power to regain its national 
identity and prestige. I strongly believe that if the underlying cause of 
conflict between Iran and the US  the Palestinian-Israeli issue  is resolved, 
those three outstanding issues would be irrelevant in the eyes of 
Americans.110 
Asgar-Khani was on the front-line of Iran’s reversal on nuclear weapons in the 
mid-1980s, while he was the prime minister.  His entrenched views reveal a hard-line 
attitude toward the security myth.  His credibility, access, and influence place him as the 
number two myth maker. 
3. IRGC Commander in Chief Yahya Rahim-Safavi  
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Yahya Rahim Safavi is in a 
particularly strong position to influence IRGC and regular military commanders with his 
hard-line views of nuclear weapons.  Most alarming to western analysts is the 
presumption that he is nominally in charge of not only Iran’s missile force, but also the 
command and control of all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons systems.  
In May, 1998, Safavi’s remarks to IRGC commanders in a private session were 
leaked to the Iranian press.  Safavi’s candor can only reveal the conservatives’ impatience 
with President Khatami’s reformist agenda, which was largely blocked by the Council of 
Guardians.  Addressing Khatami’s foreign policy, Safavi ranted,  
Can we withstand American threats and domineering attitude with a policy of 
detente? Can we foil dangers coming from America through dialogue between 
civilizations? Will we be able to protect the Islamic Republic from international 
Zionism by signing conventions to ban proliferation of chemical and nuclear 
weapons?111 
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Michael Eisenstadt, commenting on Safavi’s remarks toward the chemical 
weapons convention (CWC) and the NPT noted that “in both cases, it would seem that 
Safavi's preference would be to clandestinely circumvent these treaties, one way or 
another. It remains to be seen if he will carry the day.”112  In his role as IRGC 
commander, Eisenstadt wondered if Safavi’s opinion could be the decisive vote for any 
future Iranian venture away from the NPT. 
D. THE NUCLEAR INSECURITY MYTH MAKERS 
Iran’s insecurity myth makers are the “Hired Gun” myth makers to shield the 
clandestine nuclear weapons program from international scrutiny.  It is not possible to 
know if these myth makers are kept in the dark about the clandestine side of the weapons 
program, or if they are calculated liars.  Still, many of these figures manage to sound 
sincere and are always “on message” with the insecurity myth and pro-NPT talking 
points.  As a rule, the insecurity myth makers are reformists, as opposed to conservatives, 
but that distinction is a fine one.  They are staunchly loyal to the concept of the Islamic 
republic, but the reformers are more pragmatic in their views on foreign relations and 
economics.  I have identified three insecurity myth makers, based on their position, 
influence, and consistency in public statements:   President (Hojjatoleslam) Mohammad 
Khatami, Deputy Foreign Minister for Asia and Oceania Mohsen Aminzadeh, and 
Gholam Reza Aqazadeh. 
1. President (Hojjatoleslam) Mohammad Khatami 
Khatami has been president since 1997 and was the Director of the National 
Library from 1992-97.  His rise in Iranian politics came when he was the Minister of 
Culture and Islamic Guidance in the cabinets of both President Rafsanjani and Prime 
Minister Mirhossein Mousavi, from 1981-92.  Shahram Chubin judges him to be a 
moderate reformist.113  As president, Khatami has been the most consistent to deny any 
Iranian nuclear weapons program and speak firmly in favor of staying in the NPT and 
signing the additional protocol.  Khatami’s reformist agenda was largely blocked during 
both his terms as president, but he maintains an optimistic outlook while striving for a                                                  
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rapprochement with the West.  He was able to successfully negotiate a much needed 
trade agreement with Europe and another with Japan.  Khatami seems to view the nuclear 
weapons issue as a side show that serves to block the Islamic republic from progressing 
with more important issues.  On this point he is squarely at odds with the conservative 
clerics that run the Councils of Guardians and Expediency.  After the February 2005 
presidential election, expect to see Khatami assume a quieter role within the Iranian 
government, where he will not be able to challenge the hardline conservatives on foreign 
policy issues. 
At the height of the additional protocol debate in September 2003, Khatami made 
almost daily pronouncements reaffirming Iran’s intent to live up to its NPT 
responsibilities.  His denials of a weapons program focused primarily on the religious and 
right to technology elements of the insecurity myth.  Commenting to IRGC officers on 14 
September 2003, Khatami said, “It is [an] integral part of the fundamental duties of the 
Islamic Republic, and one of its most basic principles, to become more and more 
equipped with science and technology, including nuclear technology.  We don’t want 
nuclear arms, no, no, no, this is against our policy and our faith, but we want to be strong 
and being strong means to have technology, and nuclear technology is the most advanced 
. . .”114  Keeping strictly to his talking points, Khatami avoided making any direct 
comments on the 12 September 2003 IAEA ultimatum to sign the additional protocol.  
In August 2004, Khatami responded to Israeli missile tests, reiterating Iran’s 
position on the NPT and nuclear weapons:  "Due to our ideological beliefs, we can't 
acquire nuclear weapons . . . we can't use nuclear weapons even if they are used against 
us.”  Khatami said Iran was willing “give all the necessary guarantees” that it will not 
produce nuclear weapons.  He asserted, however, that Iran would not give up its nuclear 
power program and is “entitled to obtain capabilities to go through the full nuclear fuel 
cycle, from extracting uranium ore to enriching it for use as reactor fuel . . . We don't 
want anything beyond this. It's our legitimate right and no country can prevent us from 
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achieving it.''115  Again, Khatami was able to stay on message, and reiterate the Islamic 
prohibition for nuclear weapons, while reaffirming Iran’s right to exploit nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes.  It is likely he will continue in his role as religious 
apologist for the Iranian nuclear energy program after he steps aside as president in 2005. 
2. Deputy Foreign Minister for Asia and Oceania Mohsen Aminzadeh  
Mohsen Aminzadeh is a little more obscure than Khatami within the Iranian 
government, but his role for Iran’s relations with Asia is crucial for maintaining the trade 
agreement Iran signed with Japan in 2002.  A reformist, Aminzadeh ties national security 
to the domestic agenda; to him they are not separate concerns.  His remarks in September 
2003 emphasized the economic costs and security vulnerability themes from the 
insecurity myth:  
Those with nuclear weapons capability are not necessarily more 
powerful than the ones without. In the past century, when military 
capability was considered the main basis of power, this was true. But 
today such a view has no meaning. Pakistan has accomplished a nuclear 
weapons test. But this test has done nothing to enhance Pakistan’s position 
in the world. Instead it has created problems for this country. If India had 
not tested, Pakistan would not have tested either, given the great problems 
associated with [nuclear testing]. India’s nuclear testing did not lead to its 
enhanced [global] position either; rather it has implied a kind of extremist 
and baseless competition. If India’s standing in the world is improving, 
this is due to her rapid economic, scientific, industrial progress and her 
political and social situation. This is also true of Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Australia and other countries that do not have nuclear 
weapons…The Cold War and its military competition is over. Military 
balance no longer has the same strategic position as before and having 
[nuclear] weapons does not bring immunity for us. The Soviet 
disintegration showed that a superpower armed to the teeth with the best 
arms, if without superior economic and social indicators will move 
towards total disintegration and military capability can be of no help.116  
 
Aminzadeh’s post gives him much visibility with states important to Iran’s 
economic future; his ability to relate Iran’s security questions with its economic concerns 
helps him keep the Islamic Republic’s friendly façade at the fore.  On a trip to Japan in 
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July 2004, Aminzadeh did not miss a chance to reinforce the theme that Iran will remain 
true to its NPT agreements’ telling Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi “we 
intend to sincerely cooperate with the IAEA . . . we will make every effort to resolve the 
issue in a transparent manner.”117  Aminzadeh seems to project a calming demeanor to 
external audiences, and this is likely Khamenei’s calculation: reassure the international 
community that Iran does not think of the insecurity myth as a myth.   
3. Gholam Reza Aqazadeh 
Soon after his election to president in 1997, Khatami replaced the reportedly 
incompetent Reza Amrollahi as head of the AEOI with Aqazadeh.  Reaction among Iran 
observers was guarded: Aqazadeh built a reputation as an aggressive and accomplished 
administrator while serving as the oil minister before his appointment to the AEOI.118  
Aqazadeh immediately pledged to not only continue but expand Iran’s atomic power 
program, announcing a plan to purchase “several” new reactors after completing the light 
water reactor at Bushehr.  Nearly as staunch a defender of Iran’s civilian nuclear program 
as Khatami, Aqazadeh has been heard to say numerous times that “peace and stability 
cannot be achieved by means of nuclear weapons.”119  This theme echoes the second and 
third elements of the insecurity myth, that nuclear weapons will undermine Iran’s 
international standing and subject it to external attack.   
In a May 2003 presentation to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Aqazadeh boldly 
defended Iran’s development of fuel cycle production facilities.  Hinting at the double 
standard for dual use technologies Iran has long claimed, Aqazadeh bristled at 
international allegations that Iran’s uranium enrichment facility is designed to develop 
nuclear weapons.  He defended Iran’s right to produce and use nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes arguing, “I should say that at present over twelve countries are 
engaged in uranium enrichment activity . . . can one then claim that all these countries are 
working to develop nuclear weapons? Can advances in chemistry or microbiology be 
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construed as a tendency to develop chemical or microbiology weapons?”120  Aqazadeh’s 
aggressive defense put the emphasis on Iran’s right to develop peaceful technology, a key 
element of Iran’s insecurity myth.  Aqazadeh seems to be well suited to be the bulldog 
defender of the AEOI; a requirement to remain competitive within Iran’s bureaucracy and 
as a consumer of international aid.  
E. POLICY LEVERS TO DISCREDIT THE SECURITY MYTH 
Within the myth maker model, Lavoy provides prescriptions to counter the 
security myth.  Many of them have to do with reinforcing norms, such as the nuclear 
taboo, and not rewarding proliferators for their successes.121  These are long-term policy 
goals that must be enacted on national and international levels.  The challenge for 
discrediting the security myth is to change individual minds and outlooks; to foment 
change from within the state.  Targeting policy measures to subnational processes is 
difficult; trying to influence state decisions on the individual level even more so.  
Nevertheless, U.S. and allied policymakers need to work issues on the individual level 
simultaneously with system level efforts.  To engage the Iranian population in the nuclear 
weapons issue, the United States needs to help foster an internal debate and help educate 
that debate.  Any attempt by the United States to influence the political and public debate 
within Iran must obviously be handled indirectly and discretely.  Discovery of American 
meddling in Iranian political discourse would kill the debate and ignite the fierce 
nationalism I discuss in chapter II.   
1. Foster an Internal Debate 
The first step to discrediting the nuclear security myth within Iran is to help shape 
an educated, public debate about nuclear weapons.  Despite the fact that Iran is an 
authoritarian state, recent years have seen a widening capacity within the press to 
entertain public policy debates.  There are still dangers in this pursuit; since 2000, more 
than eighty Iranian newspapers have been summarily shut down and “dozens” of 
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journalists thrown in jail.122  Still, the Iranian populace seems to want more transparency 
in its governmental processes, and it is increasingly willing to speak out on issues of 
concern.  Shahram Chubin and Robert Litwak point out that until recently, what little 
policy debate occurred in the press was domestic in nature.  That changed in 2003 when 
the mainstream media began publishing widening view points opposed to the state’s carte 
blanche support of the Palestinians.123  Chubin and Litwak observe that “Iran has a 
vibrant, restive, and skeptical public, which is increasingly given to criticism, debate, and 
scrutiny of a regime that has squandered its political legitimacy.”124 
Even with a growing trend of more daring media debate, a nuclear weapons 
debate in Iran is difficult.  First, Iran’s public expertise on nuclear weapons is low; any 
discussion on nuclear weapons tends to degenerate to nationalistic slogans and anti-
Israeli or anti-American polemics.  Second, it is difficult to sustain a debate about a topic 
that is technically moot.  Since Iran is a signatory party to the NPT, it is officially not 
seeking nuclear weapons.  Third, a debate begun before there is any real expertise on the 
anti-proliferation side is prone to be hijacked by “extremists” that can “argue more 
persuasively the merits of an asymmetrical strategy to deter the United States.”125  The 
United States and European countries should leverage members of the Iranian diaspora to 
write letters or post questions to websites to start a new debate.  In order to steer public 
discussion within Iran, the United States cannot be seen as dictating or lecturing.  
American media outlets can provide the fora, but Iranians must provide the voices.   
2. Educate the Internal Debate 
For an Iranian nuclear weapons debate to be useful, it must be informed.  Without 
thoughtful, educated points of view, such a debate will devolve into emotional taunts.  In 
order to get an educated debate, U.S. organizations need to penetrate Iran’s authoritarian 
veil and get meaningful materials to individual people.  The most promising avenues are 
through nongovernmental sources that provide factual, educational materials.  The easiest 
                                                 
122 Wendell Steavenson, “Iranian Dissident Jailed for 5 Years is Pardoned,” News Telegraph Online 
(Tehran: 11 June 2002); http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main; accessed September 2004. 
123 Chubin and Litwak, “Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations,” 104. 
124 Ibid., 102. 
125 Ibid., 106. 
54 
access to individual Iranians is through the Internet; even the Iranian security 
organizations cannot keep track of the multitude of web-based resources Iranians are 
increasingly accessing.  Other avenues are radio and television.  Deputy Secretary of 
State Richard Armitage highlighted in his remarks to the U.S. Senate in October 2003, 
that Radio Farda operates twenty-four hours a day, along with Voice of America.126  The 
U.S. State Department also operates a Persian language website, with more than three 
thousand “hits” per day.   
The intent is to feed the Iranian public debate by providing non-political and non-
threatening scientific information on nuclear weapons.  Particularly useful would be 
educational data that illustrates the economic and social costs of nuclear weapons.127  
Other materials could be scientific in nature, explaining the physics and effects of nuclear 
weapons.  Historical accounts of economic and political challenges other nations have 
faced could follow, to put the politically “neutral” material in perspective.  By focusing 
Iranian attention on factors other than security and nationalism, the insecurity myth can 
begin to take hold.128 
F. CONCLUSIONS  
 Iran is successfully employing both the nuclear security myth and the insecurity 
myth to at once inspire a nuclear weapons program and to cover it up.  Iran’s myth 
makers are different kinds of experts than other nuclear states had.  Rather than scientific 
experts, Iran has political experts who have the longevity and influence within the 
government to make the myths hold.  The security myth makers are experienced 
politicians that were on the ground floor of the Islamic Republic’s resurgent nuclear 
weapons program, during the war with Iraq, in 1984.  The insecurity myth makers, in 
contrast, tend to be reformist politicians who can put a good face on the Iranian atomic 
energy program while they systematically lie to cover up the weapons program.  Time 
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will tell if the insecurity myth makers will have the influence to remain after the last of 
the reformers is out of government in 2005.   
The remaining question is whether it is too late to reverse the security myth.  Has 
the security myth become institutionalized at every level of bureaucracy?  This is the 
topic for chapter IV, where I look at the competing bureaucratic structure within the 
Iranian government and how the nuclear institutions have taken on lives and 
constituencies of their own.  As the United States continues to try to convince Iran to 
abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, it needs to enlist the support of the Iranian 
people, themselves.  By first fostering, then educating an Iranian internal debate on 
nuclear weapons, the United States can help the Iranian people wrest the issue from the 
supreme leader’s secretive inner circle.  If the ruling clerics lose control of the debate, no 
amount of suppression can put the issue back in the bottle.  The advent of the Internet and 
Iranians’ natural skepticism are the best tools available to unglue the Iranian nuclear 
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IV. IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND BUREAUCRATIC 
POLITICS 
In the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war, a group of Iranian government and 
military leaders recognized the strategic threat Iraq posed with its chemical weapons.  
Seizing the opportunity, this ad hoc coalition convinced Ayatollah Khomeini to reverse 
his previous decision to freeze Iran’s nuclear program, based on Iran’s need for self-
reliance in the face of international isolation.  The nuclear infrastructure developed since 
the late 1980s now has a parochial self-interest; a decision to abandon the nuclear option 
would end the bureaucracy’s purpose.   
This chapter explores Iran’s competing bureaucratic politics in two parts.  In part 
one I contend Iran’s nuclear weapons program is sustained by parochial politics within 
the bureaucratic agencies charged with managing the program.  In part two, I offer policy 
recommendations, adapted from the current literature, to subvert Iran’s nuclear weapons 
coalition while inducing its rival bureaucracies to expand and compete against nuclear 
weapons.   
Iran’s strategic environment dictated a self-reliant balance against Iraq and other 
regional threats, nuclear myth makers institutionalized Iran’s nuclear security myth, and 
now the program exists to maintain the status of the agencies that run it.  Tension 
between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular military, or 
Artesh, is centered on which commands more power.  Since the establishment of the 
IRGC as a professional fighting force instead of an ideologically fanatic militia, the 
IRGC has sought to eclipse Artesh influence by controlling Iran’s “special” arsenals.  
Similarly, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) competes with the IRGC for 
resources, even while managing research projects for the military under front companies.  
Further, the AEOI has a running rivalry with the Iranian parliament and other energy 
organizations because of its preferential treatment by the supreme leader and his inner 
circle.   
I argue that the best way to combat these bureaucratic inertias is to continue 
counterproliferation agendas on a broader, multilateral scale while simultaneously 
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appealing to competing bureaucracies with economic incentives.  Subverting the nuclear 
organization within Iran will help erode its power while buying time for economic and 
energy initiatives to take hold. 
A. IRAN’S BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
1. Bureaucratic Politics Theory 
Bureaucratic politics refers to a sub-national model of policy formation based on 
the interactions of agencies and coalitions to determine state policy consistent with their 
own parochial interests.  The theoretical foundation for sub-national analysis rests with 
the pioneering work of Graham Allison.129  Allison developed sub-national analysis into 
two distinct models to explain state behavior as either pre-determined outcomes of 
entrenched organizations, or as the bargained outcomes of competing political 
institutions.  This chapter focuses on the model Scott Sagan developed from Allison’s 
work.130  Sagan’s “Domestic Politics Model” is similar to Allison’s “Model III,” in that it 
“focuses on the domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from 
pursuing the bomb.”131   
Allison countered traditional realist theory with two alternative models.  His 
“model II,” based on organizational processes, posits that state policy is the result of 
predetermined outputs, governed by standard operating procedures of the relevant 
governmental sub-organizations.  To study Iranian policymaking with this model, 
however, would require a more detailed understanding of Iran’s organizations’ standards, 
programs, and repertoires than is possible for an outside observer to know.132  More 
pertinent to the study of Iran and its nuclear program is a derivative of Allison’s model 
III.  In this model, Allison coins the phrase “governmental politics,” which has evolved 
into “bureaucratic politics.”133  In the bureaucratic politics model, the basic unit of 
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analysis is “governmental action as political resultant.”134  The “resultant,” in this case, is 
not a “chosen” decision, but rather the result of factionalized maneuvering, bargaining, 
and compromise among the bureaucratic sub-components of which the government is 
comprised.  The relative power of each component determines its level of influence, 
setting the policy direction by manner of the strongest wielded influence within the 
bureaucracy.135   
The Iranian bureaucratic structure is even more complex and redundant than it 
looks on paper.  The players understand the formal and informal power structures about 
which outsiders can only guess.  Within the military establishment, influence is brokered 
by personal networks among officers familiar with each other through family, religion, 
and education affiliations.  Family ties also link prominent officers with civilian officials 
and bureaucrats in key positions.  This allows close coordination and consensus building 
before contentious issues can be debated within the parliament, or Majlis, or in the 
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).136  The tangled relations within the IRGC, 
or Pasdaran, and Artesh officer corps is a microcosm of governmental power affiliations 
in general.137  These personal networks can be stronger than institutionally grounded 
power.  The balance to competing power centers within the state decision-making 
apparatus is that the major agencies all report directly or indirectly to the supreme leader. 
138 
The model Allison developed and Sagan recast is distinguished from the 
individual level of analysis by the degree to which each individual player is intertwined 
with the role he plays as the leader of a specific bureaucracy.  The “chiefs” must 
represent the interests and priorities of their “Indians.”  The bureaucracy’s parochial 
interests combined with the leader’s personal outlook determine each participant’s 
position with respect to particular issues.  Although individual pronouncements matter in 
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bureaucratic politics, the agency makes the man as much as the man makes the agency.139  
For instance, the strong influence former Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
brings to his current position as head of the Expediency Council helps make that forum 
very influential with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei.  However, if 
Rafsanjani were merely an independent clerical scholar, it is doubtful he would still 
command such attention by the supreme leader.  The combination of Rafsanjani’s 
forceful personality and the legitimacy of his position on the Expediency Council give 
him a synergistic power neither he nor the council would possess alone.  Rafsanjani’s 
placement within the leader’s inner-circle allows him to be the lead nuclear security myth 
maker, as I outline in chapter III. 
Developing Allison’s Model III into a specific structure for nuclear proliferation, 
Sagan sub-titles his model as “Nuclear Pork and Parochial Interests.”140  Sagan’s model is 
based on the internal, political forces that serve their needs with nuclear weapons 
programs, regardless if nuclear weapons serve the larger state interests.  In this realm, 
bureaucratic actors from civilian scientific institutions, special military units, and political 
arms often form “coalitions” strong enough to control the governmental decision making 
process, through either controlling information or by direct political power.141  The 
important distinction of the bureaucratic politics literature is how it portrays the 
bureaucratic actors not as “passive recipients of top-down political decisions,” but rather 
as active participants that create “conditions” which favor proliferation to counter 
perceived threats.142   
The “bottom-up view” of this theory attributes power and influence to the sub-
national actors involved in security policy and weapons procurement decisions.  Because 
the individual agencies that are involved in weapons programs depend on budgetary 
support to survive, they have an inherent interest to expand their role and importance to 
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the state’s overall policy strategy to continue to operate.  There is compelling evidence 
that the IRGC, long assumed to be in charge of the military component of Iran’s nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons programs, has formed a close relationship with the 
civilian technical institutions responsible for developing and manufacturing the 
technology required for such weapons.  Gregory Giles argues the web of inter-
organizational cooperation developed for Iran’s chemical warfare program is a probable 
model for its nuclear weapons research as well.  Giles reveals how, since the IRGC 
“initially lacked the technical and industrial base” to develop these weapons, the Defense 
Industries Organization and commercial agencies in the National Industries Organization 
colluded to develop research and production plans.143  Adding bureaucratic redundancy 
and depth to the project, the state also created Revolutionary ad hoc organizations to help 
meet production demands during the Iran-Iraq war.  According to Giles, there were more 
than a dozen such agencies operating throughout Iran by the early 1990s, “each 
representing a key constituency.”144  Having created so many agencies with overlapping 
responsibilities, the state infused natural competition among them for limited resources, 
influence, and recognition.  Giles argues that this bureaucratic competition to survive and 
prevail may drive “production push,” rather than relying on “consumer demand.”145   
Sagan suggests sub-organizations form coalitions to control information available 
to decision makers and cast security solutions that support their interests as necessary to 
state survival.  Sagan’s model, like Allison’s before him, challenges the automatic 
imperative of proliferation predicted by balance of power theory advocates.  Such an 
insight into the bureaucratic forces within the Iranian government can help explain why 
Ayatollah Khomeini prevented further nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
development when he took power, contrary to what realism would predict.  Because 
Khomeini viewed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons use “inconsistent” with 
Islam, it took considerable effort for the chemical warfare lobby, mainly civilian research 
arms aligned with the Artesh, and the IRGC, to convince him to fight back in kind with 
                                                 




the Iraqi army.146  Had Iraq not used its chemical weapons to such devastating effect in 
the 1980s, the conservative clerics may have succeeded in preventing any nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons program development in Iran to this day.   
The ability of a bureaucratic coalition to change the Supreme Leader’s position in 
this instance lends merit to the model on the question of Iran’s unconventional weapons 
and in particular, nuclear, programs.  In this case, as Sagan suggests, nuclear weapons are 
not an obvious solution to a strategic challenge, they are a ready-made solution in search 
of a problem that will justify their existence.147  Security threats are the natural problem 
on which parochial interests jump, but not the catalyst to sustained weapons program 
decisions, in this model.  It can be similar to acquiring a new weapons system, then 
developing the doctrine it is meant to support.   
Given that bureaucratic leaders maintain intertwining networks to influence 
competitors, it is likely they eventually view security issues—outwardly—similarly to 
each other. This is especially so in autocratic Iran; once the leader endorses a policy, the 
governing ministers obey orders, with little room for dissent.  Since decision making in 
the government is influenced heavily by “horse trading” and mutual concessions to form 
a consensus, security issues are viewed as the reason for the state’s existence, distracting 
the populace from domestic economic problems.148  This need for consensus is an 
ingrained, cultural norm.  Although the Artesh has constitutional authority for security 
planning, policy outcomes are “compromises of the security community and its political 
masters.”149  This makes “rogue operations” among the security organizations very 
unlikely: privately, agency leaders plot against each other, but will rarely directly 
challenge one another.  The “institutional structure” ensures adequate oversight.150  The 
IRGC has its own “red lines,” for autonomous action, however.  If the guards’ corps 
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perceived a threat to the regime, or to revolutionary ideals, it would likely act on its own 
to preserve the state.151 
In order to derive Iran’s nuclear weapons policy decision making from the 
outside, we can trace the rise and fall of the prominent security agencies’ relative 
influence with the Supreme Leader’s inner circle of clerics and trusted advisors.  An 
example of such a rise and fall of prominent influence within the Islamic Republic 
bureaucratic structure lies with the IRGC.   
2. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
The IRGC was formed to provide the clerical leadership of the Islamic Republic a 
reliable instrument to ensure the success of the revolution and balance the Artesh, which 
the mullahs mistrusted from the start.  The early tasking of the IRGC was to provide 
security for the leadership and maintain public order.  The IRGC was mainly employed 
as a counter-insurgency force to maintain state control.  Born as an instrument of the 
revolutionary leaders and employed extensively as its body guards, the IRGC was the 
arm of choice to lead the war against Iraq after its 1980 invasion of Iran.  Growing during 
the Iraq war from ten to fifty thousand in 1982 and two hundred fifty thousand by 1985, 
the IRGC was forced to reorganize itself into military units.152  Part of this reorganization 
included designation of the Pasdaran’s own ministry and equipping as a parallel navy, 
army, and air force to those forces of the Artesh.  Brandished as the heroes of the Iraqi 
war, the IRGC was given control of Iran’s surface to surface missile units and “right of 
first refusal” for all newly procured military equipment, including Iraqi armor and 
artillery captured on the front.153   
In 1989, the establishment of the Ministry of Defense put the IRGC under the 
same organizational structure as the Artesh, scrapping the IRGC ministry.  Although this 
represented a shift in power towards the Artesh, it was still minor.  The defense ministry 
may have had one commander, but he was drawn from the IRGC and not the Artesh.  As 
the IRGC transformed into a professional fighting force in the early 1990s, the regime 
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seemed to acknowledge lessons from the costly casualties in the Iraqi war: “revolutionary 
fervor” was no match for modern technology employed by a professional military.  Iran 
was thus motivated for complete technological self-reliance in developing a deterrent to 
any potential enemy, especially Iraq, Israel, and the United States.154  Because the IRGC 
was conceived of political functionality; it has long been prone to public displays of 
political orientation.  In contrast, the Artesh has always been more pragmatic, reserving 
public pronouncements of political importance for the political leadership.   
Consistently displaying quiet professionalism during President Khatami’s tenure 
has likely helped shift the power balance between the IRGC and the Artesh back in favor 
of the Artesh.  The most prominent public event to mark this shift was a public attack by 
the IRGC commander on President Khatami, blaming his “liberal policies” for the 
student riots of 1999 and 2000.155  The IRGC general was forced to retract his statements 
and the IRGC officer corps was required to reaffirm its allegiance to the president, after 
the Artesh publicly rebuked its rival for indulging in a public political attack.   
But what can this influence mean for Iran’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons?  
Publicly and privately, active officers in the Artesh do not see a need for nuclear 
weapons.  But that line of thought is consistent with the official position of the Islamic 
Republic, which is a signatory member of the NPT.  Privately, however, many retired 
officers proclaim their support for nuclear weapons as the best “equalizer” for Iran’s 
small military against larger conventional and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
equipped enemies.156  This is a significant statement, given the influence the retired 
officers still hold over the active officers and their civilian sponsors and mentors.  
Because the Iranian tradition of consensus networking doesn’t end at retirement, it is a 
safe assumption the retired officers’ attitudes represent the underlying attitudes, if not the 
policy, of the highest reaches of Iranian leadership.  The current officers cannot subvert 
or contradict Iran’s stated policy to not pursue nuclear weapons, but the retired officers 
are not under such restrictions. 
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It is likely that the military establishment, along with the Council of Expediency, 
and led by the supreme leader—unarguably the most influential power broker in the 
government—see several benefits to nuclear weapons and are keeping their options open 
by developing the technical know-how and industrial capacity to support a fully 
functional, indigenous nuclear weapons capability.  Chief among these benefits are 
continued nationalistic fervor among the population, “bolstering the regime standing in 
the eyes of Iranians and throughout the Arab and Muslim world,” and gaining leverage 
over the United States and its allies in any future confrontation or crisis.157   
3. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 
Since the Islamic Republic began its present nuclear weapons program in 1984, it 
has developed a network of laboratories and suppliers to research and develop nuclear 
technologies.  The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, or AEOI, supervises most of this 
activity.  The AEOI rose in prominence throughout the 1990s, as Iran built its nuclear 
infrastructure.  Responsible for the bilateral contract with Russia for finishing the light-
water reactor at Bushehr, the AEOI had tremendous autonomy.  In the political ebb and 
flow of influence and prominence, the AEOI reigned autonomously for fifteen years 
without authoritative oversight by the Majlis.158   
The AEOI is an all-encompassing organization that manages all aspects of atomic 
research, energy production, fuel production, education, and regulatory safety.  Formed 
by the shah in 1973, the AEOI is an internationally recognized official body representing 
Iran’s civil nuclear program.159  The largest AEOI project is the seven-thousand 
megawatt light-water reactor at Bushehr, followed by the one-hundred thousand square 
meter uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, and a heavy-water reactor in Arak.  The 
Bushehr light-water reactor has been plagued with delays, which the AEOI claims are 
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related to difficulties making Russian components work with parts left in the original 
portions of the reactor complex, when a German company was building the site.160   
The head of the AEOI, Iran deputy president Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, is 
responsible for implementing plans that the foreign ministry or the SNSC order, based on 
each ministry’s priorities.  The problem can be to resolve differences between the two.  
The foreign ministry is responsible for deciding issues with international partners and 
suppliers, such as the Russians working on the Bushehr light-water reactor; while the 
SNSC is responsible for prioritizing secret projects within Iran, such as the Natanz 
uranium enrichment facility.161  While Aqazadeh is fairly open, now, about the uranium 
enrichment plant at Natanz, it was a secret project covered by front companies until it 
was exposed by an Iranian opposition group in 2002.   
Hoping to prevent a U.S.-Iranian agreement on backing Iraq’s Shi’a during the 
impending U.S. invasion of Iraq, an Iranian opposition group revealed to Western 
intelligence sources the nature of the construction in Natanz and Arak.162  The documents 
the group provided detailed who the project leaders are and where they came from.  
Further, the documents outlined the names, nature, and reporting lines for the front 
companies used to conceal the AEOI activity and funnel money for payroll and 
contracting.163  When confronted with this information, including photos, in early 2003, 
Iran admitted the existence and nature of the projects in Arak and Natanz.164  Given the 
proven reliability of that portion of the document, it is interesting to note that the group 
asserts the Kan Iran company is a front for the AEOI “military program.”165  This 
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suggests that the AEOI is involved in or coordinating more than enrichment activities; it 
appears to be researching weapons related applications for military laboratories. 
The AEOI has close working relationships with many of Iran’s technical 
universities, research institutions, and military industrial organizations.  These 
communities have developed a co-dependence that helps sustain the influence and power 
of each institutional base.  The power and parochial nature of the scientists’ self interests 
came to light in the fall of 2003, while the European Three additional protocol debate 
heated up.  In an open letter to the government, more than five hundred students and two 
hundred fifty faculty members from Sharif Technical University, in Tehran, wrote that 
any agreement by Iran with the IAEA to forego uranium enrichment, or otherwise curtail 
Iran’s nuclear program would be “treason.”166  The students’ and scientists’ immediate 
concerns centered on accepting a concession with the IAEA that would prevent these 
organizations from “achieving their goals of survival and ‘logical’ expansion.”167  This 
episode illustrates an expectation among the workers and scientists that the state will 
maintain their livelihood, regardless of other state interests.  This is the parochialism that 
imbeds itself into political attitudes in favor of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons 
in order to sustain the status quo. 
4. Other Bureaucratic Rivalries 
Because the AEOI was traditionally co-managed between the SNSC and the 
foreign ministry, it was able to operate without much, if any, oversight by the Majlis.  
Many Majlis ministers resented the AEOI attitudes; when debating key appropriations 
bills for the AEOI, agency officials would refuse to testify or show the Majlis accounting 
documentation.168  Although the AEOI, and Aqazadeh, answered to the SNSC, the Majlis 
betrayed resentment for the slights at every request for cooperation.  At the same time, 
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the oil and energy ministries were subject to Majlis oversight but had declining roles in 
Iranian planning. 
In an apparent bid to check the power of the AEOI, the Majlis voted in April 2004 
to merge the atomic organization with both the oil ministry and the energy ministry, 
forming one new organization known as the energy ministry.169  By naming the new 
organization as the energy ministry, the Majlis appears to be de-emphasizing the AEOI.  
This may be to make its clandestine functions easier to hide, within a larger bureaucratic 
shell; or it may actually be a power play by the Majlis to exert more control over the 
organization that has frustrated it and the other energy ministries for so long.  Regardless, 
being subordinated to the energy ministry represents a loss of prominence and influence 
for the AEOI.  If the Majlis ratification is not blocked by the Council of Guardians, the 
merger is scheduled for early 2005.  Time will tell if that means a vote of no-confidence 
by the government, if aspects of the nuclear program are being transferred to military 
organizations to prevent further leaks, or if it is a bureaucratic power play by the energy 
ministry and its Majlis sponsor. 
From this model and the supporting evidence framing Iran’s previous 
unconventional weapons processes, one can conclude that at least part of Iran’s 
motivation to continue its nuclear weapons program is rooted in bureaucratic competition 
and self-preservation.  Strategically, the only existential threats to Iran remaining after the 
fall of Iraq are Israel and the United States.  These states form a circular threat, however; 
if not for Iran’s nuclear weapons program, neither the United States nor Israel are likely 
to attack Iran.170  In twenty-five years of Iranian terrorism sponsorship, neither country 
has acted militarily against Iran for terrorism.  Because bureaucratic inertia is part of the 
reason Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, the United States must consider a policy 
strategy that addresses counterproliferation avenues at the sub-national level, working to 
find levers that can influence the pull of bureaucratic coalitions within the Iranian 
government.  The best strategy for this is to undercut or subvert the nuclear bureaucracy, 
while encouraging rival organizations, such as energy or economic coalitions, to grow.   
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B. LEVERS FOR U.S. POLICY 
The majority of the literature recommends some level of engagement in order to 
ease the pressure on Iran and allow it to decide that improved economic relations are 
preferable to a nuclear standoff with the West.  These recommendations range from 
unilaterally ending the U.S. trade embargo, to releasing the Iranian assets frozen in U.S. 
accounts since the 1979 revolution, to providing aid for energy infrastructure 
development.171  Notwithstanding the fact that Iran would have to accept this 
engagement, these recommendations may be too conciliatory for no real return on U.S. 
demands over the last twenty-five years.  However, there are two areas on the sub-
national agenda the United States can address through a new strategy of “cooperative 
containment:” Subvert Iran’s nuclear weapons bureaucratic coalition with multilateral 
sanctions and empower rival economic bureaucracies through trade incentives.172  
 
1. Cooperative Containment  
The United States has been holding onto the “dual containment” policy since 
1995, when U.S. president Clinton attempted to simultaneously deal with Iraq and Iran.  
Unfortunately, the attempt to unilaterally contain both countries did not work.  In Iran’s 
case, the European Union and Japan each negotiated separate trade agreements with Iran, 
undercutting U.S. efforts to keep Iran isolated.  Similarly, U.S. indirect sanctions on 
materiel suppliers since 1996 have slowed but not stopped Iran’s acquisition of nuclear-
related technology.   
For a containment strategy to work against Iran, it must be multilateral.  Any 
sectors within Iran that have been slowed by unilateral U.S. action have been balanced by 
other nations ready to fill the void.  This is a real concern; part of Russia’s unwillingness 
to abandon bilateral agreements with Iran is because it does not want to see the same 
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contracts fulfilled by another country.173  If another state fills the contract, Russia loses 
the financial reward and hurts its standing for a follow-on contract, while Iran has beaten 
the intent of the sanction in the first place.  A unilateral Russian move can be undercut as 
easily as an American action.   
In the wake of Iran’s defiant stand against the IAEA, the international mood is 
ripe for a multilateral agreement on Iran.  Having agreed to fully disclose all aspects of its 
fuel cycle and sign the additional protocol, Iran has inflamed the European Three with its 
announcement in the summer of 2004 to resume uranium enrichment.174  A multilateral 
“coalition of the willing” could impact Iran’s nuclear program on the state level by 
undercutting the nuclear bureaucratic coalition’s need for technological supplies and raw 
materials while simultaneously encouraging rival bureaucratic organizations, such as the 
energy, economic, and import sectors.   
If the nuclear coalition is forced to continually extend its timeline because it lacks 
the required materials to meet program milestones, or its secrecy veil is compromised, its 
credibility and power will erode.  If its competitors see an opportunity to seize power, 
they will.  If economic interdependence in the energy and oil sectors were to provide a 
sense of security that the AEOI cannot, there would be a predictable power shift.  The 
challenge is to find policy levers within the Iranian government upon which the United 
States can act without triggering a nationalism fire-storm that “buttresses” the hard-
liners’ positions that the only way to counter the United States is with nuclear 
weapons.175   
2. Subvert Nuclear Weapons Bureaucratic Coalition 
To undermine the Iranian nuclear bureaucracy means to disclose, deny, and delay 
its activities in order to force the ruling mullahs to conclude that the cost for nuclear 
weapons exceeds the benefits.  By exposing secret projects, denying fuel alternatives, and 
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delaying weapon production progress, a multilateral coalition can affect sub-national 
conditions and the bureaucratic power associated with the AEOI and IRGC.  An 
international effort should focus on enhanced intelligence and counterproliferation 
strategies, including interdiction and indirect sanctions.  
The most meaningful breakthroughs in discovering the dimensions of Iran’s 
nuclear weapons program have come through intelligence.  The Iranian confirmation of 
the secret facilities at Natanz and Arak came only after an Iranian opposition group 
revealed their existence to Western intelligence agencies.  As Iran gets closer to 
controlling an entire fuel cycle, counterproliferation strategies require increased 
intelligence efforts to expose prohibited activities and confront Tehran.  To keep pressure 
U.S. and European intelligence agencies need to cultivate human intelligence sources 
within Iran and even within the program.  Russia can provide immense intelligence 
support, with its hundreds of technicians and engineers working throughout the 
program.176   
There is much debate about the effectiveness of pursuing supply side 
counterproliferation strategies.  Strained relations with Russia have complicated previous 
U.S. agreements to limit nuclear-related aid, and recent revelations about covert 
assistance from Pakistan indicate that it is impossible to stop the flow of technological 
assistance in every instance.177  Still, the overall effort has been successful in keeping 
Iran from completing every aspect of design and production of nuclear weapons, and 
should continue.   
Russia has the largest capability to influence the Iranian nuclear program.  The 
multilateral coalition should pressure Russia to enforce its fuel agreement at Bushehr and 
“check other avenues of proliferation.”178  Russia has the leverage to pressure Tehran to 
abide by its nonproliferation agreements; without the strategic backing of Russia and the 
technical support of Russian firms, the light-water reactor at Bushehr cannot operate.  To 
prevent the Bushehr reactor from becoming a proliferation avenue, Moscow cannot allow 
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spent fuel to accumulate within Iran; it must promptly collect all spent fuel and hold Iran 
accountable for all fissile material it provides.179 
The U.S. congressional sanctions against individual companies that provide 
banned support to Iran need to be expanded.  With multilateral backing, it will be more 
difficult for individual corporations to ignore “American” sanctions.  Any violations 
discovered by the IAEA should be reported to the UN Security Council.  The more 
partner governments are in the “coalition,” the better the chances of avoiding competitive 
undercutting of abandoned contracts and real support of counterproliferation measures. 
3. Empower Rival Economic Bureaucracies 
The United States must look at economic stimuli to entice rival Iranian 
bureaucratic factions.  Iran is interested in increased trade opportunities, energy 
infrastructure investment, and expanded markets for petroleum exports.  Europe, Japan, 
Russia, India, and the United States can offer heavy investment in Iran’s markets and 
petroleum infrastructures, but such an incentive needs to be set with strict conditions.  
First, the United States should communicate to Iran, through its European partners, the 
conditions for any future economic engagement.  These conditions should remain as they 
have been: Iran must publicly and demonstrably disavow its support and training of 
terrorist organizations, any pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
inconsistent with the regime protocols to which it is a signatory, and it must renounce its 
stated purpose to assist the Arab states destroy the state of Israel.180   
The United States can remove hurdles for Iran to assimilate into the community of 
nations, but they must be attached to Iranian retrenchment on terrorism, nuclear weapons, 
and Israel.  George Perkovich advocates unilateral economic incentives, to cast them as 
detached from nuclear or terrorism concerns.  He proposes the United States drop its 
objection to Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
unilaterally end economic sanctions.181  The danger with such a move is that Tehran 
could pocket the cash injection and continue—or expand—its support for terrorist 
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organizations and its nuclear program.  The United States should endorse Iranian 
membership in the WTO, but only pending verifiable concessions from Iran in its 
terrorism support and unconventional weapons obligations.  Similarly, unfreezing the 
shah’s assets and ending the trade embargo are on the table, pending verifiable agreement 
to international conditions.182 
Iran’s economic state is so bad, that a real proposal from the international body 
for WTO membership and increased investment would create a favorable motivation for 
Iran’s economic bureaucracy to pursue conditions for market reform.  Trade 
bureaucracies could push for trade liberalization, financial deregulation, increased 
privatization, and copyright protections.183  The old mercantilists of the bazaar would 
oppose opening trade barriers and expanding markets.  The new bazaar, however, is very 
interested in expanding imports and managing foreign investment for privatizing Iranian 
industry and banking.184  A genuine promise of such opportunities would motivate the 
new bazaar to lobby for Iranian concessions on terrorism, proliferation, and Israel at the 
expense of the ruling elite and especially the nuclear bureaucracy.   
Similarly, the oil and natural gas organizations would push for greater production 
and exports.  Iran is rumored to vent off enough natural gas equivalent to the annual 
power production of the Bushehr reactor.185  Reinvigorated petroleum infrastructure and 
refinery facilities would allow Iran to increase oil and natural gas production, refining 
capability, and export potential while reducing its gasoline import requirements. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter connects the bureaucratic nature of Iran’s motivation to continue its 
pursuit for nuclear weapons to relevant policy options that act on the sub-national level in 
order to influence Iran to stop its weapons program and seek rapprochement with the 
West.  Iran’s threat environment has changed since it began its nuclear weapons program.  
With Iraq essentially eliminated as a strategic threat, Iran’s nuclear coalition is avoiding a 
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realistic reevaluation of its threat environment.  Iran’s nuclear weapons program is 
sustained by bureaucratic inertia and competition within the military and industrial 
complex in order to maintain the prominence of those agencies.   
These policy recommendations are pertinent to the bureaucratic politics model of 
action because they target the mini-coalitions within the Iranian government that vie for 
power and resources.  Empowering competing lobbies to the nuclear weapons 
bureaucracy makes internationally acceptable interaction more likely while hindering 
proliferation efforts.  Economic and energy reform would do more to add to Iran’s 
stability and security than a nuclear weapon.  The challenge is to get the right bureaucrats 
to reach that conclusion, with the power to enact the vision.  By plainly communicating 
the requirements for releasing frozen assets and economic aid, the ruling mullahs will 
have a clear choice: they can reform and renounce, or face economic failure and spiraling 
unrest at home.   
In order to successfully persuade Iran to stop its nuclear weapons program, the 
United States needs to enact policies that address bureaucratic relationships.  The 
difficulty for a foreign government to act at a sub-national level mandates the United 
States engage proxies and allies to carry messages and information to the Iranian 
leadership, press, and population at large.  Nothing recommended in this chapter 
advocates giving Iran a free pass on its historic misdeeds.  Each of these initiatives is 
predicated on Iran fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations and renouncing all forms of 
terrorism and support for terrorist organizations.  Doing so can only help Iran look 
inward and either reform on its own or collapse of its own dead weight.  Either outcome 
offers hope for a non-nuclear Iran, but the United States must be ready to offer immediate 




Why does Iran want nuclear weapons?  This thesis looks at the causal reasons for 
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons on three analytic levels: the system level, state level, 
and individual level.  Interestingly, the findings on each analytic level are interrelated in 
ways that make the causal factors at each equally important.  Iran has legitimate strategic 
security concerns. It also has strong-willed individuals who have propelled the myth that 
self-reliance and nuclear weapons are the only means to solving those security issues.  
And, after twenty years of developing a nuclear infrastructure, Iran has an entire class of 
bureaucrats, managers, and technicians that have built careers on the nuclear program and 
are unwilling to lose their standard of living.   
Mixed in at each level is a fiery nationalistic pride.  Iran sees itself as the natural 
leader of the Persian Gulf; for security, trade, culture, and religious ideology.  Iran’s 
ruling mullahs believe that deploying nuclear weapons will magically wield great 
political power and influence; and that nuclear weapons will provide a cost-effective 
deterrent capability against all regional and international threats.  They hope for national 
security while believing in the nationalist myth. 
This chapter reviews the main findings at each analytical level to relate the causal 
factors to the policy levers they reveal.  A concerted policy strategy aimed at preventing a 
nuclear Iran must be multilateral, comprehensive, and account for the motivations at the 
different action levels to have a chance at success.  The growing political unrest in Iran 
will not amount to a revolution or regime change any time soon.  The best hope for 
preventing a nuclear Iran is to hold it to its nonproliferation responsibilities while 
offering economic carrots for a comprehensive renouncement of terrorism, nuclear 
weapons, and hostility toward Israel. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. System Level 
Iran’s strategic environment has changed sharply in the last twenty years.  Iran 
began its nuclear program while engaged in a bitter struggle against Iraq.  Uncertain of 
the Soviet Union’s intentions beyond Afghanistan while politically isolated and facing 
76 
ruthless chemical attacks by the Iraqi army, Iran’s leaders embarked on a self-reliant 
rearmament plan.  Among the regional threats arrayed against Iran, Iraq was paramount.  
Iran’s top priority was to develop a deterrent against any further invasion and especially 
use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons against it.   
As a small status quo state, Iran has no overt military ambitions beyond its 
borders.  Its grand strategy is to foster a Gulf leadership role while providing a credible 
deterrent to any future attack.  To support that strategy, Iran adopted a deterrence 
doctrine.  Facing nations with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, Iran sees 
nuclear weapons as the only tool available to provide an adequate deterrence.  Nuclear 
weapons are the technical requirement to fulfill Iran’s military doctrine. 
As the 1990s began, the landscape changed.  The Soviet Union collapsed and the 
nuclear weapons based in central Asia went away.  Afghanistan fell into continuous civil 
war, while Iraq was emasculated by UN sanctions and U.S.-led containment in the form 
of no-fly zones.  In order to maintain the appearance of a strategic threat to Iran, it 
elevated the status of Israel and the United States to fill the void left by Iraq.  
Rhetorically, casting Israel as the main threat to Iran, and to Islam, resonated with Iran’s 
nationalistic populace.  It also helped Iran mend relations with many of the Gulf Arab 
states and subtly moved Iran back towards a Gulf leadership role. 
Iran set a course for nuclear weapons as a self-reliant means of attaining a 
credible deterrent.  The only remaining strategic threats to Iran are inflated; the United 
States and Israel do not pose a strategic threat to Iran except for its nuclear program.  
Over a twenty-five year period of Iranian support to terrorist groups that have attacked 
Israeli and American interests, neither Israel nor the United States has acted militarily 
against Iran.  Nothing indicates that would change, barring a clearly directed attack 
against vital interests of either country.   
If Iran deploys nuclear weapons, it risks greater security problems than those it 
would have solved.  The Gulf States would run closer to the United States for a security 
guarantee.  Pakistan and even India would be forced to account for Iranian capability, 
changing the focus from each other to Iran.  Israel would take a greater interest in Iran, if 
it had nuclear weapons, as would the United States.  Some larger Arab states may be 
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pushed to proliferate in response, also.  Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps Egypt are all 
candidates for proliferation as a response to a successful Iranian breakout.  All of these 
possibilities ensure a greater American presence in the region; all are outcomes Iran 
wishes to avoid.  An Iranian bomb makes Tehran more vulnerable than it is without it.  
Iran’s strategy is based on a strategic environment that no longer exists.  It is reluctant to 
reevaluate security options in the new environment because it believes in the nationalist 
myth of nuclear security.  
2. Individual Level 
Iran is engaged in a nuclear hedge strategy.  It is developing the capability to 
develop nuclear weapons, but the supreme leader may not have made the final decision to 
cross the nuclear threshold.  The opacity under which the program is proceeding allows 
plausible deniability so Iran’s nuclear suppliers can assist while still conforming to the 
restrictions of the NPT.  While it builds the technological infrastructure and industrial 
base required to produce nuclear weapons, Iran is institutionalizing competing myths to 
propel the program. 
Well-placed elites, with political influence at the highest levels, are perpetuating 
the nuclear security myth to inspire Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  Simultaneously, the 
Iranian government is employing the nuclear insecurity myth as a public front to conceal 
the opaque weapons program.  Moderate and reform-minded politicians systematically lie 
to promulgate the insecurity myth.  The security myth makers are rarely heard outside 
closed door sessions with the leader’s inner circle.   
When the veil of secrecy is occasionally lifted, outside observers can glimpse the 
four elements of Iran’s security myth: Iran is at risk from Zionist and imperial American 
nuclear weapons; Iran has no great-power alliance options; Iran’s destiny is to lead the 
Persian Gulf; and a self-reliant deterrence is the only way to meet the Zionist/imperialist 
threat.  The primary security myth maker is former president and current secretary of the 
expediency council Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani.  
With precise regularity, the insecurity myth makers appear in public to deny 
Iranian efforts at proliferation and are always on message, stressing the four key 
components of the insecurity myth: nuclear weapons are un-Islamic; nuclear weapons 
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will undermine Iran’s international commitments; possessing nuclear weapons would 
make Iran more vulnerable to external attack; and although Iran is not pursuing nuclear 
weapons, it is its right under the NPT to develop all aspects of non-military uses of 
nuclear power.  The lead nuclear insecurity myth maker is President Mohammad 
Khatami. 
Iran’s myth makers are effective because of their continuity in government since 
the formative days of the current nuclear program.  Unlike other nuclear powers, Iran’s 
myth makers are not scientists but politicians.  Iranian politicians have the required 
continuity within the governing system and the interpersonal networks to exert the 
required influence for the myth to have an effect.  Iran’s scientists lack the continuity.  
Iran treats its scientists like black boxes: they plug them into different programs and areas 
of expertise as required.  They never acquire the necessary political connections to affect 
any serious political debate.  Iran’s countervailing myths help the bureaucratic 
institutions that support both the civil and military nuclear programs.  The myths inspire 
the scientists, technologists, and workers that are pushing the programs forward.   
3. State Level  
The bureaucratic organizations and coalitions that have formed within the nuclear 
weapons program exert tremendous influence within the Iranian government.  The 
priority the Islamic Republic assigned to the nuclear program ensures it is well funded 
and well supplied.  Accordingly, the managers and leaders of this bureaucracy expect to 
maintain their lifestyle.  Iran’s nuclear weapons program has become the solution looking 
for a problem.  Nuclear bureaucrats use the nuclear myth to justify developing nuclear 
weapons and sustain the program.  An honest reappraisal of Iran’s threat environment 
would endanger the weapons program, so the weapons coalition pressures the state to 
avoid such an evaluation. 
Among Iran’s prominent bureaucracies, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 
(AEOI) has created the most animosity among the Majlis.  Majlis members complain that 
the AEOI routinely ignores requests for information and auditing inquiries.  The AEOI 
depends on the Majlis for funding, but it answers to the foreign ministry for external 
supplier and support issues; and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) for 
clandestine projects.  The AEOI is run by Iran’s vice president, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh.  
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An aggressive and competent administrator, he commands fierce loyalty from his 
organization.  The AEOI is charged with managing all aspects of Iran’s nuclear energy 
program and some weapons-related work as well.   
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is the military arm responsible 
for Iran’s missile programs and chemical weapons.  It is assumed to also head the 
military effort for nuclear weapons.  Ayatollah Khomeini created the IRGC as a 
politically reliable security organization to counterbalance the regular military, or Artesh.  
The IRGC claimed a superior status to the Artesh, until the Iranian government enacted 
several equalizing measures in the late 1980s.  The IRGC was converted from an 
ideological militia to a professional fighting force, instituting a formal rank structure and 
assuming traditional military missions.  The natural tension between the Artesh and the 
guards rose as the IRGC assumed more of the secret missions within the Iranian military, 
but has waned in recent years as the Artesh has grown in favor among the Majlis and 
others. 
The Majlis seemingly struck a blow at the AEOI in April 2004 when it voted to 
merge the organization with both the oil and energy ministries.  Subjugating the AEOI to 
rival minister oversight may make future clandestine management difficult.  It is unclear 
if the merger will occur, but it may signal a transfer of military-related nuclear programs 
to the IRGC.  The AEOI has managed its clandestine programs through a maze of front 
companies to launder money and hide the connections of its projects.  When an Iranian 
opposition group revealed the locations of two major nuclear projects, in Arak and 
Natanz, the AEOI scrambled to explain the nature of the programs to the IAEA.  Such 
revelations have cast considerable light in places the Iranian government wants to keep 
dark.  The future of the Iranian nuclear weapons program will include more military 
involvement as Iran gets closer to producing weapons.  The power shift from the AEOI is 
underway. 
Overall, the thesis finds a connecting thread among the three levels.  Legitimate 
balance of power factors required a self-reliant power balance.  A coalition of connected 
individuals convinced Ayatollah Khomeini to reverse a decision to halt nuclear research 
by using the security myth, exaggerating the balance of power threat.  State bureaucracies 
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have vested interests in the nuclear weapons program and exert pressure to keep the 
program a priority to maintain the lifestyle to which they have become accustomed.  Iran 
is motivated to produce nuclear weapons by elements from each of the analytical levels. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In each chapter, I adapted policy recommendations from the current literature to 
address the motivational factors at each level.  For any of them to have an effect, they 
must all be employed together, as multi-layered strategy.  The synergistic effects of 
efforts at the individual, state, and international levels outweigh the effects of a single 
measure at one level. 
1. System Level 
• Reduce threat perceptions 
The key to influencing Iran at the system level is to compel it to reevaluate its 
strategic environment in light of the reduced threat array in the region.  The West must 
find a way to convince Iran there are alternative security solutions to nuclear weapons.  
To counter Iran’s rhetoric about the Israeli and American threat to Iran, U.S. policy must 
work to reduce threat perceptions. 
The United States needs to do what it can to stop stoking Iranian nationalism.  
Iranian discourse will always be nationalistic; Iranians are proud of their culture and 
think they deserve the same status and capabilities as any other nation.  But talk of “axis 
of evil” and regime change from the U.S. administration unnecessarily elevated Iranian 
nationalism and undercuts legitimate diplomatic discourse and opportunities. 
• Minimize Israeli threat posture 
The United States can do much to reduce Israel’s threat posture to Iran.  Iran has 
signaled it would accept any Israeli peace plan the Palestinians would accept; the United 
States, therefore needs to make the Israeli-Palestinian roadmap for peace a top priority.  
No Iranian nuclear agreement can be reached without addressing Israel.  The United 
States needs to place Israel’s military capabilities into the context of a deterrent against 
all the Arab capability lined up against Israel.  Iran cannot expect to make Israel disarm 




• Encourage Gulf Security Organization 
The United States needs to encourage the Gulf States to reexamine the idea of a 
collective Gulf security organization to include the new Iraqi government and Iran.  
Although U.S. participation needs to be discreet, it needs to convey the message that the 
future security environment of the Gulf should be guaranteed by Gulf States; and that the 
United States wants to turn Gulf security missions over to the Gulf’s natural leaders.  
Although the track record for previous attempts is discouraging, it should be a high 
priority to help Iran decide its strategic view is dated. 
2. Individual Level 
• Discredit the Security Myth 
If the nuclear security myth was the human impetus for Iran’s nuclear weapons 
program, then nonproliferation policy needs to focus on discrediting the myth.  Because 
the myth is essentially institutionalized within the atomic bureaucracies, U.S. efforts need 
to target the larger Iranian population to foster and inform an educated debate on the 
utility of nuclear weapons in the Iranian strategy 
• Foster internal debate 
First, the United States needs to help Iranians see the issue as an internal question 
that does not involve U.S. imperialism.  Iranians are increasingly skeptical and willing to 
debate political issues in the daily newspapers.  Despite the threat of jail time, Iranians 
continue to take opposing sides to the government to air out important issues.  The United 
States needs to encourage Iranian expatriates and other nations to pose nuclear questions 
in  daily letters columns, or on the internet, to spark debate.  
• Educate the internal debate 
Previous Iranian discussions of nuclear weapons were poorly informed.  For the 
Iranians to have a meaningful nuclear debate, it must include accurate information and 
avoid emotional or nationalist rhetoric to hijack the argument.  U.S. proxies, or non-
governmental organizations can provide educational material on the physics of nuclear 
weapons, their destructiveness, or their financial, economic, and political costs. Such 
material can be broadcast on Voice of America, or posted on popular web sites.  Once the 
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Iranian populace exhibits a willingness to debate the issue, the United States needs to 
disappear from view, and let the various Iranian factions discuss among themselves. 
3. State Level  
• Cooperative containment 
The United States should assemble a new coalition of allies to enact a multilateral 
containment.  This cooperative containment would have two overarching goals: to 
undercut the nuclear weapons bureaucracy while simultaneously encouraging rival 
bureaucracies to expand and lobby for their own interests.  
• Subvert nuclear weapons bureaucracy 
Undermining the Iranian nuclear weapons program means to detect, delay, 
disrupt, and expose its components.  The United States needs to use multilateral pressure 
to step up intelligence within Iran, prevent technology and raw material transfers, and 
confront Tehran over every violation exposed.  The U.S. counterproliferation effort has 
succeeded in its primary goal, to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.  More 
can be done with multilateral pressure on individual suppliers and other states.  Unilateral 
U.S. sanctions should be expanded among the new coalition; and the member states 
should pressure Russia to hold Iran to the fuel agreement for the light-water reactor at 
Bushehr.  Russia holds the most strategic leverage over Iran, since it has control over the 
Bushehr reactor; if Russia withdraws its support, Iran will have to find a new contractor 
and redesign the reactor for a third time.   
• Empower rival bureaucracies  
The most promising rival bureaucracies are oil, energy, and trade.  The 
multilateral coalition needs to offer Iran significant economic incentives for renouncing 
nuclear weapons, terrorism, and ending militant opposition to the Israeli peace process.  
The oil and energy coalitions are desperate for foreign investment to improve 
infrastructure, create refinery capabilities, and open trade markets.  Iran’s new bazaar 
merchants want to open trade for foreign goods, and reform import licensing to make it 
easier to distribute imports.  The promise of World Trade Organization membership and 
vast foreign investment in a wide variety of sectors could be a strong incentive for Iran to 
agree to the grand bargain.   
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C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Taken together these policy measures can exert tremendous pressure on Iran by 
opening up a public debate that questions the contradictions of Iran’s nuclear policy, the 
dangers of nuclear weapons, and demands market reforms to improve its standard of 
living.  International pressure from above, combined with intra-state pressure from 
within, and popular pressure from below could make the economic incentives irresistible.  
If counterproliferation efforts delay progress for a bomb long enough, these other 
incentives may be seen as security enhancing in themselves, and find champions within 
the ruling party.   
The United States and its coalition must not give up on Iran.  As Iran gets closer 
to an indigenous, self-sufficient nuclear capability, sanctions and interdiction will have 
less of an effect.  Policy focus then needs to shift to upholding the norms within the NPT 
and the costs of failing to abide by its provisions.  Multi-layered, multilateral pressure 
needs to begin now to avoid a gap in effort when such a focus shift is required. 
The ruling conservatives hijacked the Majlis in the February 2004 elections.  
Observers believe the 2005 presidential election will be similar.  With the conservatives 
running all aspects of the Islamic Republic, there may be an opportunity for a grand 
bargain.  If the conservatives realize they need to enact social and economic reforms, they 
may be waiting until the reformers are all out of government to ensure the conservatives 
get the credit.   
Despite what many may hope, the present regime is firmly in control.  The 
opposition and youth movements inside Iran lack the required organization to effect 
incremental change, to say nothing of regime change.  The United States cannot wait and 
hope for regime change.  Nor can it unilaterally give Iran something for nothing.  If the 
United States is seen as complicit in extending the conservatives’ grip on power because 
of a premature engagement, the next regime will hold Washington in as low regard as the 
present one.  The embarrassment of the failed European Three initiative is fresh enough; 
the United States must strengthen a multilateral approach and keep the pressure on Iran 
until it agrees to the grand bargain.  The West must act to show the mullahs that the ball 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
85 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1971. 
 
Amuzegar, Jahangir. “Iran’s Crumbling Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 
2003). 
 
________. “Iran’s Theocracy Under Siege.” Middle East Policy 10, no. 1 (Spring, 2003): 
135-153. 
 
Ansari, Ali M. Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After. London: Pearson 
Education Limited, 2003. 
 
Armitage, Richard L. “U.S. Policy and Iran.” Washington, D.C.: Deputy Secretary of 
State Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 28 October 2003. 
Available from: http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/25682.htm. Internet; accessed 27 
August 2004. 
 
Baktiairi, Bahman and Haleh Vaziri. “Iran’s Liberal Revolution?” Current History 
(January 2002): 17-21. 
 
Betts, Richard K. “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation Revisited.” In The 
Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results. Ed., 
Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel. Portland: Frank Cass, 1993: 100-126. 
 
Bolton, John R. “Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 
Washington, D.C.: Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security; 
Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on 
the Middle East and Central Asia, 24 June 2004. Available from: 
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33909.htm. Internet; accessed 27 August 2004. 
 
Buchta, Wilfried. Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic. 
Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 2000. 
 
Byman, Daniel L., Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold Green. Iran's 
Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. Washington: Rand National Defense 
Research Institute Publications, 2001. Available from: 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1320/. Internet; accessed February 2004. 
 
Chubin, Shahram. Iran’s National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions, and Impact. 
Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994.  
 
86 
________. “Iran’s Strategic Environment and Nuclear Weapons.” In Iran’s Nuclear 
Weapons Options: Issues and Analysis. Ed., Geoffrey Kemp. Washington, D.C.: 
The Nixon Center, 2001. Available from: 
http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/IransNuclearWeaponsOption
s.pdf. Internet; accessed February 2004. 
 
________. Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security, Adelphi 
Paper 342. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Chubin, Shahram and Robert S. Litwak. “Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations.” The 
Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4. (Autumn 2003): 99-114. 
 
Cordesman, Anthony H. Proliferation in the “Axis of Evil”: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002. Available 
from: http://www.csis.org/burke/proliferation_axis.pdf. Internet; accessed 4 
February 2004. 
 
Eisenstadt, Michael. “Iran Under Khatami: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, and 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” Washington, D.C.: Statement before the United States 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian 
Affairs, 14 May 1998. Available 
 
Farhi, Farideh. “To Sign or Not to Sign? Iran’s Evolving Debate on Nuclear Options.” In 
Iran’s Bomb: American and Iranian Perspectives. Ed., Geoffrey Kemp. 
(Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 2004). 
 
Frankel, Benjamin. “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation.” In The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and 
What Results. Ed., Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel. Portland: Frank Cass, 
1993: 37-78. 
 
Giles, Gregory F. “The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
Weapons.” In Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Weapons. Ed., Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James 
J. Wirtz. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000: 79-103. 
 
Goldstein, Avery. “Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: Theoretical Explanation and 
China’s National Experience.” In The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons 
Spread and What Results. Ed., Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel. Portland: 
Frank Cass, 1993: 213-55. 
 
Hadian, Nasser. “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contexts and Debates.” In Iran’s Bomb: 
American and Iranian Perspectives. Ed., Geoffrey Kemp. (Washington, D.C.: The 





“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: 
Report by the Director General.” Geneva: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
10 November 2003. Available from: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf#xml. 
Internet; accessed 30 August 2004. 
 
International Crisis Group. “Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program.” Middle East Report 
no. 18. (Amman/Brussels, 27 October 2003). Available from: 
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2330&l=1. Internet; accessed 5 
November 2003. 
 
Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30, no. 2 
(January 1978): 167-214. 
 
Jones, Peter. “Iran’s Threat Perceptions and Arms Control Policies.” The 
Nonproliferation Review 6, no. 1.  (Fall 1998): 39-55. Available from: 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/61/jone61.pdf. Internet; accessed 21 November 
2003. 
 
Karsh, Efraim. The Iran-Iraq War: 1980 – 1988. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002. 
 
Keddie, Nikkie R. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003. 
 
Kemp, Geoffrey. “Iran’s Bomb and What to Do about It.” In Iran’s Bomb: American and 
Iranian Perspectives. Ed., Geoffrey Kemp. (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 
2004). 
 
________. “Iran’s Nuclear Options.” Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options: Issues and 
Analysis (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 2001). Available from: 
http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/IransNuclearWeaponsOption
s.pdf. Internet; accessed 4 February 2004. 
 
Kemp, Geoffrey and Walter Lippmann. “How to Stop the Iranian Bomb.” The National 
Interest, no. 72 (Summer 2003):48.  
 
Lavoy, Peter R. “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation.” In The 
Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results. Ed., 
Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel. Portland: Frank Cass, 1993: 192-212. 
 
Levite, Ariel E. “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited.” International 





McMillan, Joseph. “The United States and a Gulf Security Architecture: Policy 
Considerations.” Strategic Insights III, no. 3 (March 2004). Available from: 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/mar/mcmillanMar04.asp; Internet; accessed 
March 2004 
 
Mackey, Sandra. The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the Soul of a Nation. New York: 
Penguin Putnam Inc., 1998. 
 
Perkovich, George. Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Challenge. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, April 28, 2002. Available from: 
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/Iran/iraniannuclearchallenge.pdf. 
Internet; accessed 10 February 2004. 
 
Perkovich, George and Silvia Manzanero. “Plan B: Using Sanctions to End Iran’s 
Nuclear Program.” Arms Control Today (May 2004). Available from: 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_05/PerkovichManzanero.asp?print. Internet, 
accessed 30 August 2004. 
 
Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 
between the World Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. 
 
Quillen, Chris. “Iranian Nuclear Weapons Policy: Past, Present and Possible Future.” 
Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 2 (June 2002): 17-24. Available 
from: http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/meria/quc02_01.pdf. Internet; accessed 5 
February 2004. 
 
Sagan, Scott D. “The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems,” 
In Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical Weapons. Ed., Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000: 16-46. 
 
________. “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb.” International Security 21, No. 3. (Winter 1996-1997), 54-86.  
 
Samore, Gary. Future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. Brussels: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, European Security Forum, 3 March 2003. 
Available from: http://www.iiss.org/eusec/samore.htm. Internet; accessed 9 
December 2003. 
 
Schaffer, Brenda. “Iran at The Nuclear Threshold.” Arms Control Today. Washington, 
D.C.: Arms Control Association, (Nov 2003). Available From: 




Schake, Kori N. and Judith S. Yaphe. The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed 
Iran, McNair Paper 64. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies, 
National Defense University, 2001. 
 
Takeyh, Ray. “Iran’s Nuclear Calculations.” World Policy Journal 20, no. 2. (Summer 
2003): 21-28. 
 
________. “Iranian Options: Pragmatic Mullahs and America’s Interests.” The National 
Interest, no. 73 (Fall 2003): 49-56. 
 
“Treaty on The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” IAEA Information Circular. 
INFCIRC/140. Geneva: 22 April 1970. 
 






























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
91 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
